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INTRODUCTION
Title IX has become shorthand for the issue of campus sexual assault. So
common is Title IX attention on campus sexual violence that it is easy to forget
how recently campus sexual violence was a neglected issue. Only after years of
student activism did the federal government begin to address campus sexual
violence.' In 2014, President Obama created the White House Task Force to
Protect Students from Sexual Assault.2 In his work on the issue, President Obama
likely became the first U.S. president to even mention campus sexual violence,
let alone work to combat it.3
Unsurprisingly, then, most governmental work to protect students from
campus sexual violence has happened at the federal level. Title IX,4 a decades-
old law barring institutional recipients of federal education funds from
1. Two of the most prominent student activist groups are Know Your IX, Know Your IX: Empowering
Students to Stop Sexual Violence, KNow YOUR IX, http://knowyourix.org/ [https://perma.cc/C5D9-
MXT9], and End Rape on Campus, End Rape on Campus, END RAPE ON CAMPUS, http://
endrapeoncampus.org/title-ix/ [https://perma.cc/RUC6-SEXN].
2. President Obama credited student activists for bringing campus sexual assault to the country's
attention. Tyler Kingkade, College Sexual Assault Survivors Hope That Obama's Task Force Will
Lead to Real Change, HUFFPOST, Jan. 22, 2014, 8:40 PM, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01
/22/college-sexual-assault-obama-task-force n_4646897.html [https://perma.cc/X2SY-EYF8] (last
updated Jan. 25, 2014). Secretary of Education Arne Duncan also acknowledged student activism as
a driving force for the federal government's response. See Katie Zezima & Nia-Malika Henderson,
Personal Conviction and Outside Pressure Led to White House Sexual Assault Push, WASH. POST,
Apr. 30, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/04/30/the-white-houses-
policies-on-women-have-been-shaped-by-personal-forces/ [https://perma.cc/NUP9-YDHK].
3. See, e.g., Nina Burleigh, In 2014, Rape Rage Drove Feminism's 'Third Wave', CNN, Dec. 9, 2014,
http://www.cnn.com/2014/12/09/opinion/burleigh-feminism-rape-speaking-out/ [https://perma.cc
/7ETZ-7C9J]; Jen Zoratti, The Pervasiveness of Sexual Violence, WINNIPEG FREE PRESS, Aug. 30,
2014, 1:00 AM, http://www.winnipegfreepress.com/ocal/The-culture-of-rape-Myths-misconcep
tions-and-reality-273285621.html [https://perma.cc/3523-NDB6] (quoting Jean Kilbourne saying
that "Obama is the first president, as far as I know, to talk about sexual violence").
4. Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681-88. Title IX states that "[n]o
person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance." Id. § 1681(a). The statute includes a list of exemptions, such as for
military academies. Id. § 1681(a)(4).
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discriminating on the basis of sex, has been the government's main weapon. Title
IX's enforcement authority empowers the Department of Education's Office for
Civil Rights ("OCR") to withdraw federal funding, and investigations of
schools-the first step in funding withdrawal-have so far been sufficient to
push many schools into reform efforts. Private litigation 6 and media pressure
have also prompted reform, but it was the federal government's involvement that
set off a wave of schools "scrambl[ing]" to comply. 7
Supporters of Title IX and the Obama OCR's work should not be
complacent, however. Jurisprudential and political shifts have thrown the
viability of Title IX and OCR's work into uncertainty. The Supreme Court has
hinted at a narrowing of the federal spending power, casting doubt on legislation
that depends on threats to withdraw federal funding.8 More immediate is the
political threat: the Trump Administration has been overtly hostile to Title IX
and OCR specifically, as well as freedom from sexual violence generally.
President Trump, after all, famously bragged about sexually assaulting women.9
Several of his surrogates have targeted OCR: one state co-chairman called OCR
"self-perpetuating absolute nonsense." 0 Nor has President Trump shown
himself receptive to understanding the needs of communities at the intersection
of different identities-troubling, when students of color," students with
5. See 20 U.S.C. § 3413 (2012); 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2012).
6. Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago held there was an implicit private right of action under Title IX despite
the absence of express statutory authorization. 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979).
7. Jacob Gersen & Jeannie Suk, The Sex Bureaucracy, 104 CALIF. L. REv. 881, 902 (2016).
8. Mark Walsh, Health-Care Ruling Has Implications for Education Spending, EDUC. WK., June 28,
2012, 4:44 PM, http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/school-law/2012/06/medicaid-rulinghas
implicatio.html [https://perma.cc/6BYR-QDN8].
9. See, e.g., Ben Mathis-Lilley, Trump Was Recorded in 2005 Bragging About Grabbing Women "by
the Pussy", SLATE, Oct. 7, 2016, 4:27 PM, http://www.slate.com/blogs/the-slatest/2016/10/07
/donaldtrump 2005_tape_i_grab womenby the_pussy.html [https://perma.cc/T6N6-E3PB];
Tina Nguyen, "This Is Sexual Assault": Anderson Cooper Confronts Trump with 2005 Tape, and
Trump Lashes Out, VANITY FAIR, Oct. 9, 2016, 9:39 PM, http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2016
/10/donald-trump-debate-response-lewd-comments [https://perma.cc/M9JK-2DQJ].
10. Karen Bitar et al., Title IX Enforcement and Interpretation: The Winds of Change Are Blowing, JD
SUPRA, Dec. 29, 2016, http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/title-ix-enforcement-and-interpretation-
43698/ [https://perma.cc/X76T-F8YP]. Breitbart, a website founded and run by President Trump's
Chief Strategist and Senior Counselor, Steve Bannon, has written that OCR has created "kangaroo
courts" that subject "male students to one of the most egregious ... miscarriages of justice in
American history." Milo Yiannopolous, How Donald Trump Can Save the American Campus,
BREITBART, Nov. 14, 2016, http://www.breitbart.com/milo/2016/11/14/donald-trump-save-
american-university/ [https://perma.cc/B4SN-DVZM].
11. For a discussion of how campus sexual assault can affect students of color differently from white
students, see Sexual Assault Prevention and Awareness Center, Univ. of Mich., Communities of
Color and the Impacts ofSexual Violence, https://sapac.umich.edu/article/57 [https://perma.cc/R59F
-VENB] (last visited Jan. 31, 2018). For an explanation of why students ofcolor are often reluctant
to report sexual assault, see Colleen Murphy, Another Challenge on Campus SexualAssault: Getting
Minority Students to Report It, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., June 18, 2015, http://www.chronicle.com
/article/Another-Challenge-on-Campus/230977 [https://perma.cc/W8VY-6NP3] (subscription
required; for partial text with no subscription required, see http://www.aacrao.org/resources
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disabilities, 12 or LGBTQIA1 3 students,14 among others, experience campus
sexual assault differently, requiring different responses. Because most
governmental progress on addressing campus sexual assault has been in response
to OCR's pressure,15 the new administration could put an end to almost all
progress by unilaterally halting federal enforcement efforts. Even if the Trump
Administration does not shut down federal enforcement, any federal efforts will
likely leave out marginalized communities who suffer a greater incidence of, and
more consequences from, campus sexual violence. 16 Indeed, the Department of
Education has already rescinded OCR's previous guidance and issued new
interim guidance ("2017 Q&A").17
States should step into the breach. Education and safety are traditional state
concerns, and states are empowered to legislate in this area. Even if the federal
government were currently working to prevent campus sexual assault, states
would still have an important role. States have enforcement authority, and more
local expertise. Unlike the federal government, states can tailor broad policy to
state-specific characteristics. Following the example of states like Illinois, states
/resources-detail-view/another-challenge-on-campus-sexual-assault--getting-minority-students-to-
report-it [https://perma.cc/GV59-QLK6]).
12. See, e.g., Azmat Khan, The Hidden Victims of Campus Sexual Assault: Students with Disabilities,
AL JAZEERA AM., Feb. 12, 2015, 5:00 AM, http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/2/1 2/the-
hidden-victims-of-campus-sexual-assault-students-with-disabilities.html [https://perma.cc/UPE8-
V2AF]. For a discussion of how students with disabilities experience campus sexual violence
differently from able-bodied students, see generally Patricia A. Findley et al., Exploring the
Experiences of Abuse of College Students with Disabilities, 31 J. OF INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE
2801 (2015).
13. This is a common acronym referring to people who are lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer,
intersex, and/or asexual.
14. See, e.g., Tyler Kingkade, LGBT Students Face More Sexual Harassment and Assault, and More
Trouble Reporting It, HUFFPOST, July 14, 2015, 8:05 AM, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry
/LGBT-students-sexual-assault us_55a332dfe4b0ecec7 lbc5e6a [https://perma.cc/28MQ-268Y]
(last updated Sept. 9, 2015); Adrienne Green & Alia Wong, LGBT Students and Campus Sexual
Assault, ATLANTIC, Sept. 22, 2015, http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2015/09/campus-
sexual-assault-LGBTQIA-students/406684/ [https://perma.cc/LZ6U-7NRW].
15. The DCL was issued in 2011; OCR made its list of investigations public in 2014. Press Release,
U.S. Dep't of Educ., U.S. Department of Education Releases List of Higher Education Institutions
with Open Title IX Sexual Violence Investigations (May 1, 2014), available at https://www.ed.gov
/news/press-releases/us-department-education-releases-list-higher-education-institutions-open-title
-i [https://perma.cc/4VDF-2NVS]. Afterward, "[i]n a scramble to be considered compliant and stave
off or resolve OCR investigations, schools rushed to rewrite their policies and procedures." Gersen
& Suk, supra note 7, at 902.
16. Trump has been consistently hostile to many groups who would need specialized governmental
responses, such as disabled people. See Callum Borchers, Meryl Streep Was Right. Donald Trump
Did Mock a Disabled Reporter, WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news
/the-fix/wp/2017/01/09/meryl-streep-was-right-donald-trump-did-mock-a-disabled-reporter/
[https://perma.cc/DYZ9-N6WM]. For a discussion of why certain communities require more
support, see supra notes 11-14.
17. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., Q&A ON CAMPUS SEXUAL MISCONDUCT
[hereinafter "2017 Q&A"] (Sept. 2017), available at https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr
/docs/qa-title-ix-201709.pdf [https://perma.cc/SA3X-4G4G].
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should protect their students from sexual violence,' 8 and should do so
transparently, engaging all relevant stakeholders. Acting without seeking
community input will result in a policy that misses important concerns, such as
the needs and experiences of students from marginalized communities. State
legislatures are more informed in local needs than the federal government, but it
is student groups themselves who can best articulate specific community needs.
No attempt to combat campus sexual violence can be complete without
provisions that address the needs of marginalized students-and members of
those very communities are the actors most expert in their own needs. These
students must have a voice.
Of course, not all states will govern in accordance with Title IX's purpose.
When one public university punished students found responsible for sexual
violence and racial harassment, the Georgia legislature retaliated in a move that
will no doubt deter future university compliance with Title IX's mandate." The
resulting Georgia regulations-which, for example, set the standard of proof for
expulsion lower than federal guidance does-force schools to risk violating Title
IX. Ideally, the federal government would provide oversight, challenging any
state legislation preempted by Title IX. Mindful of the political realities that
make federal oversight unlikely here, this Article emphasizes that private
litigation also has a role to play. Private individuals can and should challenge
states that go too far, relying on conflict preemption doctrine to prevent state-
level attacks on Title IX's mandate.
This Article explores how states should take action on Title IX, focusing on
state authority to act and the procedures that states should follow. This Article is
the first legal scholarship to analyze the constitutionality and policy wisdom of
various states' legislation or regulation of campus sexual violence. Part I
analyzes Title IX's constitutional basis and OCR's authority to use its newest
guidance document. Part I concludes that, while Title IX is probably
constitutional and OCR's guidance is probably legal, a successful challenge to
either cannot be ruled out. Uncertainty surrounding federal authority, of course,
makes state action all the more important. Part II therefore establishes that states
have the authority to legislate on campus sexual violence, limited only by conflict
preemption. Part III catalogues current state legislation on campus violence
assault, focusing on two contrasting examples: Illinois, which enacted
comprehensive legislation with the input of different stakeholders; and Georgia,
which passed a rushed regulatory policy after one state congressman decided a
university had been too strict in its expulsion of rapists. Finally, Part IV draws
on the strengths and weaknesses of various states' actions and lays out a roadmap
18. See infra Part III.
19. For a detailed discussion of the Georgia Board of Regents policy and what provoked it, see infra
Part III.B. .
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for states to follow. Part IV critiques even the most progressive of states for
failing to fully account for marginalized students, and calls on states to protect
all students by giving marginalized groups a real voice when crafting legislation
and policies that address campus sexual violence. This Article uniquely reaches
across substantive disciplines of administrative law, constitutional law, and
antidiscrimination law to create a roadmap for states to protect their students
from campus sexual violence.
I. FEDERAL AUTHORITY TO LEGISLATE AND REGULATE
Title IX has, for most of its history, been considered a safely constitutional
exercise of the federal spending power. However, recent Spending Clause
jurisprudence requires Title IX's supporters to defend it more carefully and to
explore its constitutionality under a different enumerated power. This Part
therefore analyzes Title IX in light of recent Spending Clause doctrine,
concluding that Title IX is probably constitutional spending legislation-but that
a successful challenge cannot be ruled out.20 Nevertheless, this Part also argues
that Title IX could likely survive under the Fourteenth Amendment-and indeed,
it has been ruled by several lower courts to be an exercise of that power.
At the next level, there are questions about the validity of OCR's guidance
on campus sexual violence. Until September 2017, OCR's two main guidance
documents, the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter2 1 ("DCL") and 2014 Questions and
Answers document 22 ("2014 Q&A"), drove most federal Title IX enforcement.
However, the Trump Administration has revoked the Obama-era guidance
documents and issued new guidance. This Part analyzes the procedural validity
of the new guidance under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") and
concludes that a court would most likely rule that OCR acted properly in
promulgating and using the 2017 Q&A-the same conclusion a court would
probably have reached if faced with the DCL and the 2014 Q&A. As with the
constitutionality of Title IX, however, there are legitimate doubts concerning the
federal government's actions. This Article cannot conclude that Title IX and
OCR's interpretation thereof are bulletproof.
20. As I note later in this Part, Title IX brings up an interesting question on the Spending Clause's unit
of analysis. That is, to date Title IX enforcement threats have been against individual universities,
not states, meaning that only individual institutions' funds have been at risk. However, states can
and do institute statewide policies, putting the entire state's federal education funds at risk.
21. Russlynn Ali, Assistant Sec'y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Dear Colleague Letter: SEXUAL
VIOLENCE [hereinafter "Dear Colleague Letter"] (Apr. 4, 2011), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices
/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf [https://perma.cc/4AGB-NZ4Z].
22. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON TITLE IX AND
SEXUAL VIOLENCE [hereinafter "2014 Q&A"] (2014), available at https://www2.ed.gov/about
/offices/listlocr/docs/qa-201404-title-ix.pdf [https://perma.cc/HC2Q-7SRD].
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A. Constitutional Authority to Legislate on Campus Sexual Violence
1. Title IX as Spending Clause Legislation
Until 2012, the legal community was not concerned with whether Title IX
was a constitutional exercise of the spending power.23 In fact, the spending power
was the only congressional power that had remained intact through the Rehnquist
Court's pattern of restricting such powers. 24 The Court had put very few
limitations on congressional power to attach conditions to federal funding, and
Title IX was not considered in danger of violating those conditions.25 However,
the litigation spawned by the Affordable Care Act ("ACA") ultimately led to a
new Court pronouncement on the Spending Clause-one that casts doubt on
Title IX's ongoing validity.
Before the 2012 case of NFIB v. Sebelius,2 6 South Dakota v. Dole was the
landmark spending case. 27 Dole announced a five-part test for spending
legislation, which deferred to Congress and was not particularly stringent. 2 8 In
brief, the Court demanded that spending legislation be in pursuit of the "general
welfare" (deferring substantially to Congress on what the general welfare
entailed), 2 9 involve unambiguous conditions for states, 30 involve conditions
related to federal interest in particular national projects or programs,31 violate no
independent constitutional bars,32 and not be coercive to the states.33
In Dole, coercion was not a major factor. Almost in passing, the Court noted
that the state was at risk of losing, at most, five percent of its federal highway
funding-an insufficient amount to be coercive. 3 4 In fact, the amount constituted
less than half a percent of the state's total budget.s Coercion, however, became
23. Courts generally agreed that Title IX was Spending Clause legislation. See, e.g., Gebser v. Lago
Vista Indep. School Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 287 (1998).
24. See Eloise Pasachoff, Conditional Spending After NFIB v. Sebelius: The Example of Federal
Education Law, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 577, 579 (2013).
25. If academics did seriously worry that Title IX was a Spending Clause violation before 2012, they at
least did not see fit to publish articles about it.
26. Nat'lFed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius [hereinafter "NFIB v. Sebelius"], 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
27. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
28. See id. at 207-11 (setting out the five-part test).
29. Id. at 207.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 208.
33. Id.at211.
34. Id.
35. NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 581 (2012).
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a critical factor in NFIB, where the Court struck federal legislation because of
coercion for the first time in its history.3 6
In NFIB, the Court focused on two characteristics of the ACA's Medicaid
expansion: that the amount of money at stake was too great and that the new
condition was not unambiguous-or even foreseeable-when the original
Medicaid program began. 37 Because Medicaid constituted twenty percent of the
average state's annual budget, the threat of its loss was "a gun to the head." 3 8
Even though Congress had written into the original Social Security Act that
Congress reserved "the right to alter, amend, or repeal any provision," the ACA's
Medicaid expansion was "a shift in kind, not merely degree." 39
Almost immediately after NFIB, commentators noted that federal education
programs were in danger. 4 0 Not only had federal education funding come up in
oral arguments, 4 1 but the NFIB opinions used education in hypotheticals. 42 Most
critically, elementary and secondary education is the second greatest federal
funding line item in state budgets. 43 It is therefore the natural target of the next
Spending Clause challenge. To be sure, plaintiffs with standing to challenge an
exercise of the spending power are rare. The Supreme Court has set out a multi-
pronged test in Flast v. Cohen, essentially requiring a plaintiff to have a sufficient
nexus with the challenged legislation.4 4 Of course, Dole shows that states may
themselves challenge an exercise of the Spending Clause. A likelier challenge to
Title IX, then, would be a state hostile to survivors' rights. Certain state
politicians, discussed in a later Part, have certainly shown themselves sufficiently
opposed to the law that such a challenge could be politically feasible.
Some Spending Clause experts have analyzed federal education legislation
in the wake of NFIB and concluded that it is probably safe from legal attack.45
However, other commentators have addressed the same question and decided
36. Id. at 625 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 583-84.
38. Id. at 581.
39. Id. at 583.
40. Mark Walsh, In Health-Law Arguments, Justices Also Weigh Education Spending, EDUC. WK. SCH.
L. BLOG, Mar. 28, 2012, 6:43 PM, http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/schoollaw/2012/03/in
medicaid-case justices also.html_[https://perma.cc/UK9N-4BP8].
41. See id.
42. Walsh, In Health-Law Arguments, Justices Also Weigh Education Spending, supra n. 41.
43. NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 683 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting
jointly).
44. 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968).
45. See, e.g., Pasachoff, supra note 24, at 582. Cf Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-Leveraging Principle
and the Spending Clause After NFIB, 101 GEO. L.J. 861 (2013) (similarly assessing the new
Spending Clause test but not discussing education).
[Vol. 29:373380
Federalism in Campus Sexual Violence
that Title IX is not necessarily constitutional.46 This Article concludes that the
Court likely will not strike down Title IX on Spending Clause grounds: even if
it is found to be coercive, its conditions are not an unfair surprise for states. NFIB
emphasized that the Medicaid expansion was a change in the type of condition,
not in its degree, and there is no such argument for Title IX, not even as it applies
to campus sexual assault. Title IX clearly states that it is about sex discrimination,
and it has for decades been settled law that sexual harassment is sexual
discrimination-and that a single instance of sexual assault can be sufficiently
severe to establish a violation of someone's equality rights.4 7 Indeed, this concept
is the basis for the entire 'body of Title VII sexual harassment law. 4 8 Because
Spending Clause scholars are in agreement that a law must be both an unfair
surprise and coercive to be unconstitutional,49 the lack of unfair surprise ends the
inquiry. However, it bears repeating that exactly what qualifies as coercive is
unknown. The Supreme Court declined to "fix a line" between persuasive and
coercive. 5 0 It could very well be an education case that announces where that line
1s.
An additional wrinkle is that the ACA Medicaid expansion-and Dole's
highway funds condition-were both addressed directly to states. Title IX, on
the other hand, governs individual academic institutions. Very few states have
created statewide sexual misconduct policies-and even in those cases, they
apply only to public universities.5 1 This structure weakens any challenger's
argument that Title IX is unduly coercive on states, because for a state to lose all
of its federal education funding because of a Title IX violation, either the state
would need a statewide policy that violates Title IX or each school would have
to be in violation of Title IX of its own accord. Of course, as states begin to
regulate campus sexual violence, more and more states will move towards state-
wide campus sexual violence policies. More state regulation on the matter is
likely to bring more federal-state conflict.
In sum, recent jurisprudence has caused some uncertainty over whether
federal education legislation like Title IX remains constitutional. However,
under what Spending Clause experts think is the new test, Title IX is safe because
46. See Patrick Haney, Note, Coercion by the Numbers: Conditional Spending Doctrine and the Future
ofFederal Education Spending, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 577, 604 (2013) (arguing that the Supreme
Court could find federal education funding coercive). Cf Ravika Rameshwar, Note, NFIB's New
Spending Clause: Congress' Limited Authority to Prevent Campus Sexual Assault Under Title IX,
70 U. MIAMI L. REv. 390, 394 (2015) (discussing amendments to Title IX, not the original
legislation).
47. See, e.g., Ferris v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 277 F.3d 128, 136 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Henson v. Dundee,
682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982)).
48. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
49. See Pasachoff supra note 24, at 594; Bagenstos, supra note 45, at 864-65.
50. NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 585 (2012).
51. See infra Part III (discussing Georgia and Louisiana).
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it is unambiguous. All the same, this Article does not suggest that defenders of
Title IX need not worry. NFIB was a shock to Spending Clause observers, and it
is entirely possible that a Title IX case could be the next surprise. It therefore
serves to question whether Title IX might be upheld under a different enumerated
power.
2. Title IX as Fourteenth Amendment Legislation
If Title IX does not survive under the Spending Clause, then it could be
upheld under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.52 Title IX seems like
a natural fit for Fourteenth Amendment legislation-for instance, Title IX
protects against a type of historic discrimination that the Court has given
heightened scrutiny 53 -but to date, the Court has declined to rule expressly on
the matter.54 But three courts of appeals have held that Title IX is an exercise of
Congress's Fourteenth Amendment authority to abrogate state sovereign
immunity. More importantly, in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School
District, the Court acknowledged in passing that Title IX abrogated state
sovereign immunity.56 At that time-1998-the Court's rule was that Congress
could only abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Since the landmark abrogation case, Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,
in 1996, the Court has been strict with Congress's attempts to abrogate state
sovereign immunity. Yet there is strong evidence that, were the Court to
confront the question directly, it would uphold Title IX under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Under the abrogation analysis-perhaps the strictest Fourteenth
52. Incidentally, Title IX would not be constitutional as an exercise of the Commerce Clause: United
States v. Morrison established that sexual violence is not economic activity capable of being
regulated by the commerce power. 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000).
53. Cf Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 730-32 (2003) (noting the importance of
heightened scrutiny to legislation under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment).
54. See Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75 n.8 (1992).
55. Franks v. Ky. Sch. for the Deaf, 142 F.3d 360, 363 (6th Cir. 1998); Doe v. Univ. of Ill., 138 F.3d
653, 659-60 (7th Cir. 1998); Crawford v. Davis, 109 F.3d 1281, 1283 (8th Cir. 1997). For a more
in-depth analysis of these cases and the relationship between Title IX and the Fourteenth
Amendment, see generally Melanie Hochberg, Note, Protecting Students Against Peer Sexual
Harassment: Congress's Constitutional Powers to Pass Title IX, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 235 (1999).
56. 524 U.S. 274, 284 (1998); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1) (2012).
57. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59-60 (1996). The Court has since ruled that
Congress can also abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Bankruptcy Clause, Central Va.
Community College v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 379 (2006), but there is no viable argument that Title IX
has anything to do with the Bankruptcy Clause.
58. See, e.g., Coleman v. Ct. of App. of Md., 566 U.S. 30, 43 (2012); Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v.
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. ofRegents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000).
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Amendment analysis, as abrogation is an affront to state sovereignty 59 -
Congress must meet two conditions. First, its intent to abrogate must be
absolutely clear.o Second, abrogation must be a congruent and proportional
response to actual civil rights violations.6 1
The first prong of the test is not seriously at issue. Congress has spoken
clearly, declaring that states do not have sovereign immunity in the face of Title
IX violations.6 2 Congruence and proportionality, however, demand a closer
analysis, as it is under this requirement that the Court has overturned statute after
63
statute. First, Congress must find a series of violations of the rights it intends
to protect.64 Second, Congress must tailor the remedy to the violation. Title IX
has done both of these things. 6 5 More importantly, Nevada Department of
Human Resources v. Hibbs shows that Congress has more leeway to legislate
under the Fourteenth Amendment when it is protecting groups to whom the Court
66 Lk hhas given heightened scrutiny. Like the legislation in Hibbs, Title IX protects
against sex discrimination. There is therefore a good chance that the Court would
hold it to be constitutional under Congress's Fourteenth Amendment authority.
Title IX is most likely constitutional even under the Supreme Court's new,
stricter spending doctrine. Even were Title IX to fail under the Spending Clause,
however, it is probably constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. All the
same, Title IX's constitutionality is by no means guaranteed. The Supreme Court
has shown itself more than capable of handing down shocking cases under both
the Spending Clause6 7 and the Fourteenth Amendment.68 Moreover, Congress's
constitutional authority to pass Title IX is not the end of the inquiry, because
most of Title IX's "requirements" are articulated in OCR guidance, not Title IX
or its regulations. This Article therefore turns to analyze OCR's Title IX
regulatory authority.
59. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 749 (1999) (discussing the "indignity of subjecting a
nonconsenting state to the coercive process ofjudicial tribunals").
60. Coleman, 566 U.S. at 35.
61. Id. at 36.
62. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1) (2012).
63. See, e.g., Coleman, 566 U.S. at 39; Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91.
64. See, e.g.,Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 730-31 (2003) ("The long and extensive
history of sex discrimination prompted us to hold that measures that differentiate on the basis of
gender warrant heightened scrutiny; here . . . the persistence of such unconstitutional discrimination
by the States justifies Congress' passage of prophylactic § 5 legislation.").
65. For a description of some of the evidence Congress heard before enacting Title IX, see William C.
Duncan, Title IX at Thirty: Unanswered Questions, 3 U. MD. L.J. RACE RELIG. GENDER & CLASS
211, 213-14 (2003).
66. Hibbs distinguished the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) provisions it upheld from the laws
the Court struck down in Garrett and Kimel on the basis that the FMLA dealt with sex, which is
analyzed under heightened scrutiny. 538 U.S. at 735.
67. See NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
68. See City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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B. Statutory and Regulatory Authority to Govern Campus Sexual Violence
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1982 itself says very little: it bars
sex discrimination in federally funded activities, with some exceptions. 6 9 OCR,
an office within the Department of Education, enforces Title IX, and most of
what people think of as "Title IX" is in fact OCR regulations and guidance.7 0
Until September 2017, OCR's most prominent guidance documents were the
DCL and the 2014 Q&A. Both were promulgated during the Obama
Administration, and both were controversial. Unlike earlier OCR interpretations
of Title IX, neither of these documents went through notice-and-comment
procedure. 7 1 The lack of notice-and-comment procedure, coupled with the way
OCR used these documents, led some commentators to argue that OCR was
treating at least the DCL as legally binding, in violation of the APA.72 Critics of
the Obama Administration's crackdown on campus tolerance of sexual violence
hoped to attack the documents on APA grounds. 7 3
For the first several months of the Trump Administration, the ongoing
vitality of the guidance documents was very much in doubt. In early September
2017, Betsy DeVos announced that "the era of 'rule by letter' is over" and that
the Department of Education would engage in notice-and-comment to draft new
regulations, presumably ones that contradict the existing guidance.74 Proponents
of the Obama guidance hoped this meant that DeVos would leave the guidance
in place until new regulations issued. In late September, however, the
Department of Education revoked both the DCL and the 2014 Q&A, issuing in
their place interim guidance ("2017 Q&A").75
Like the DCL and 2014 Q&A, the 2017 Q&A did not go through notice-
and-comment procedure, and like those documents, it calls itself a "significant
guidance document," which is not binding.76 Also like the previous two guidance
documents, the 2017 Q&A is a blend of policy statements and interpretive rules,
which do not need notice-and-comment procedure. Nevertheless, a critical factor
69. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012).
70. See 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2012).
71. Gersen & Suk, supra note 7, at 908.
72. Id. at 908-09, 911.
73. See, e.g., id.
74. Susan Svrluga, Transcript: Betsy DeVos's Remarks on Campus SexualAssault, WASH. POST, Sept.
7, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2017/09/07/transcript-betsy-
devoss-remarks-on-campus-sexual-assault/ [https://perma.cc/K423-RVXC].
75. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Department of Education Issues New Interim Guidance on
Campus Sexual Misconduct (Sept. 22, 2017), available at https://www.ed.gov/news/press-
releases/department-education-issues-new-interim-guidance-campus-sexual-misconduct [https://
perma.cc/9R6K-NY4G]; 2017 Q&A, supra note 17.
76. Compare 2017 Q&A, supra note 17, at 7 with Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 21, at I n.l and
2014 Q&A, supra note 22, at 1 n.1.
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in an APA challenge would be how OCR uses the guidance in enforcement, and
the 2017 Q&A is too new to rule out a successful challenge based on enforcement
realities.77 Whether the Department of Education would commit much energy to
defending interim guidance is another question.
The APA § 553(b)(3)(A) exempts certain agency documents from notice-
and-comment requirements. Relevant here is its exception for interpretive rules
and general statements of policy, because OCR claims that the 2017 Q&A is a
"significant guidance document . . . [that] does not add requirements to
applicable law." 7 9 The guidance documents it rescinded also so claimed.80 All
three further.refer to the Office of Management and Budget's Final Bulletin for
Agency Good Guidance Practices,81 which states that "[a]gencies may provide
helpful guidance to interpret existing law through an interpretive rule or to clarify
how they tentatively will treat or enforce a governing legal norm through a policy
statement." 82 OCR, then, treats the 2017 Q&A as both an interpretive rule and a
policy statement-just as it treated the DCL and the 2014 Q&A.
The Supreme Court has not spoken on what distinguishes a legislative rule-
requiring notice-and-comment-from an interpretive rule or a statement of
policy. However, the courts of appeals that have considered the issue are in
agreement that the test to distinguish a policy statement from a legislative rule is
whether the document has "present binding effect." 83 A two-step inquiry has
emerged: whether the document is facially binding and whether the agency
applies the document as if it were binding. 84 By contrast, the distinction between
interpretive rules and legislative rules is whether the rule has "legal effect,"
which itself has been broken into a four-part test.85 The rule is legislative if (1)
the agency would have no legislative basis for enforcement without the rule; (2)
the agency has published the rule in the Code of Federal Regulations; (3) the
agency has "explicitly invoked its general legislative authority;" or (4) the rule
"effectively amends a prior legislative rule." 86 While the tests are not identical,
77. Any proponent of the Obama-era guidance who might hope to challenge the new guidance is likely
to be disappointed: the 2017 Q&A mirrors the DCL and the 2014 Q&A in most administrative
procedure respects. There is no APA attack that would succeed against the 2017 Q&A that would
not also have overturned the Obama guidance.
78. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
79. 2017 Q&A, supra note 17, at 7.
80. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 21, at I n.1; 2014 Q&A, supra note 22, at I n.1.
81. 2017 Q&A, supra note 17, at 7; Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 21, at I n.1; 2014 Q&A, supra
note 22, at 1 n.1.
82. 72 Fed. Reg. 3432 (2007).
83. See, e.g., Elect. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
84. See id.; Profess'ls and Patients for Customized Care v. Shalala, 56 F.3d 592, 596 (5th Cir. 1995).
85. Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
86. Id.
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the information they require is very similar. Ultimately, both tests ask whether
the documents themselves purport to bind regulated parties and whether the
agency has treated them as binding.
Because OCR has carefully not written the 2017 Q&A as binding-just as it
wrote the Obama guidance-the document does not violate the APA in that
regard. Whether OCR will treat the document as binding remains to be seen, but
given a presumption in favor of the agency's characterization of the documents
and an absence of strong evidence to the contrary, reviewing courts should
determine the documents to be policy guidance and interpretive rules.
1. The Language Prong
When deciding whether an agency pronouncement is a legislative rule,
courts look first to the text of the documents in question.87 The document's
language is a "powerful, even potentially dispositive, factor"88 for determining
whether it is a policy statement. If the document uses mandatory, imperative
language-if "[i]t commands, it requires"8 9-then it is more likely to be a
legislative rule.90 The document itself may, and often does, disclaim that it is not
a legislative rule.
However, interpretive rules can use mandatory language without violating
the APA. Interpretations "will use imperative language . . . if the interpreted term
is part of a command." 9 1 The question for interpretive rules is whether they
themselves establish a basis for enforcement-in which case, they are legislative
rules in disguise. 9 2
All three guidance documents claim that they are "significant guidance," not
legislative rules, 9 3 meaning that in none of them has OCR invoked its rulemaking
authority. All three use a blend of discretionary and mandatory language: "must,"
"may," and "should" throughout.9 4 Were the question simply whether they are
policy statements or legislative rules, it would be tempting to conclude that they
are legislative rules, as they do use mandatory language. However, the
87. See Profess'Is and Patients, 56 F.3d at 596; U.S. Tel. Ass'n v. FCC, 28 F.3d 1232 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
88. Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
89. Appalachian Power Co. v. E.P.A., 208 F.3d 1015, 1023 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
90. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 818 F.2d at 947.
91. Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
92. See id. at 1109.
93. 2017 Q&A, supra note 17, at 7; Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 21, at 1 n.1; 2014 Q&A, supra
note 22, at I nt.
94. See, e.g., 2017 Q&A, supra note 17, at 1 ("the school must take steps"), 4 ("generalizations may
violate Title IX"), 5 ("a decision should be reached separately"); Dear Colleague Letter, supra note
21 at 4 ("schools should consider"), 5 ("[s]chools also should inform"), 8 ("a recipient may use"),
11 ("parties must have an equal opportunity"); 2014 Q&A, supra note 22, at 10 ("a school should
not wait"), 16 ("[e]ach school must").
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mandatory language appears only where previous legislative rules establish a
basis for enforcement. In other words, the mandatory language appears only
where the documents are interpreting legislative rules or statutes. 95
Take the Obama OCR's most controversial stance: that schools "must" use
a preponderance of the evidence standard in campus adjudications.9 6 The
preponderance requirement does not appear in any legislative rule, so critics
claimed that OCR was overstepping its regulatory authority in dictating an
evidentiary standard. Yet the DCL begins its discussion of preponderance with
a reference to previous regulation, which requires "equitable resolution of
student ... complaints."9  OCR insisted that the preponderance standard was
consistent with civil discrimination litigation, OCR's own internal
investigations, and Title IX.99 In other words, the guidance documents were not
their own basis for enforcement, but merely OCR's interpretation of "equitable,"
a requirement from a properly promulgated legislative rule.100
. Of course, the 2017 Q&A has changed the standard of evidence. Where OCR
previously set out preponderance of the evidence as the only acceptable standard,
the 2017 Q&A says that schools "should" use "either a preponderance of the
evidence standard or a clear and convincing evidence standard."' 0 ' The
document clarifies, however, that whichever standard the school uses "should be
consistent with the standard the school applies in other student misconduct
cases," referencing a case from the federal District of Massachusetts that held to
do otherwise was to deny students "basic fairness."l 02 This change is likely to be
the most controversial, given the years of dispute over the use of preponderance
95. See, e.g., 2017 Q&A, supra note 17, at 1 ("an institution that receives federal funds must ensure that
no student suffers a deprivation of her or his access to educational opportunities on the basis of sex"),
2 ("institutions must disclose campus crime statistics"), 3 ("[a] school must adopt and publish
grievance procedures"); Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 21 at 4 ("the school must process the
complaint in accordance with its established procedures"), 5 ("the school's inquiry must in all cases
be prompt"), 6 ("[rlecipients of Federal financial assistance must comply with the procedural
requirements outlined in the Title IX implementing regulations"); 2014 Q&A, supra note 22, at 1
("[a]ll public and any private . . . [schools] receiving any federal financial assistance ... must
comply with Title IX"), 8 ("[u]nder Title IX, federally funded schools must ensure that students ...
are not denied . .. educational programs or activities on the basis of sex"), 9 ("[a school] must take
immediate and appropriate steps to investigate").
96. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 21, at 11.
97. See, e.g., Farnaz F. Thompson, Eliminating a Hostile Environment Towards Colleges and
Universities: An Examination ofthe Office for Civil Rights' Unconstitutional Process and Practices,
28 REGENT U. L. REV. 225, 242 (2016); Ryan D. Ellis, Mandating Injustice: The Preponderance of
the Evidence Mandate Creates a New Threat to Due Process on Campus, 32 REV. LITIG. 65, 66-67
(2013); Gersen & Suk, supra note 8, at 908-11.
98. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 22, at 1. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.8(b) (2012). The 2014 Q&A similarly
anchors its preponderance requirement in the same regulations. See 2014 Q&A at 14.
99. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 21, at 10-11.
100. 34 C.F.R. § 106.8(b).
101. 2017 Q&A, supra note 17, at 5.
102. Id. at 5 n.19 (citing Doe v. Brandeis Univ., 177 F. Supp. 3d 561, 607 (D. Mass. 2016)).
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of the evidence. 103 Yet, if anything, the 2017 Q&A is harder to attack on this
point, at least in the field of administrative procedure, than the DCL. The 2017
Q&A has softened the language: it says "should" instead of "must."1 04
Another way of approaching the legislative-interpretive divide is to ask
whether the rule establishes legal rights or duties-or whether the rule simply
interprets or expounds on existing rights and duties.105 In American Mining
Congress v. Mine Safety and Health Administration, an agency issued a
document requiring the reporting of a diagnosis when an x-ray came back with
certain results.10 6 Previous agency regulations already required diagnoses to be
reported, but did not specify what qualified as a diagnosis.1 07 Because regulations
already established the legal duty, i.e. a basis for enforcement, the court held that
the agency document defining diagnosis was an interpretive rule.108 Returning to
the preponderance example, we see that a prior regulation already established a
legal duty: the duty to provide an equitable grievance procedure.109 The DCL and
2014 Q&A merely lay out OCR's interpretation of "equitable," rather than
creating a new legal duty. It is the regulation, not the guidance documents, that
is binding. In the case of the 2017 Q&A, not only is there no mandatory language
on this point, but there is also a federal decision supporting the document's
conclusion.110
In sum, the 2017 Q&A is not legally binding in and of itself: it creates no
legal duties or grounds for enforcement. In this respect, it is just like the Obama-
era guidance. All three documents combined elements of policy statements and
interpretive rules and are not-at least not by their own language-legislative
rules.
2. The Enforcement Prong
The text of the documents does not necessarily end the inquiry. Courts also
ask whether the "agency acts as if a document .. . is controlling in the field, if it
treats the document in the same manner as it treats a legislative rule, if it bases
enforcement actions on the ... document, if it leads [regulated] parties .. . to
103. See supra note 97.
104. Compare 2017 Q&A, supra note 17, at 5, with Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 21, at 11.
105. See Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
106. Id. at 1107-08.
107. Id. at 1107.
108. Id. at 1112.
109. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.8(b).
110. See 2017 Q&A, supra note 17, at 5 n.19 (citing Doe v. Brandeis Univ., 177 F. Supp. 3d 561, 607
(D. Mass. 2016)).
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believe ... they [must] comply with the terms of the document.""' Alternatively,
the agency could be using it to "help identify those [regulated parties] that might
be engaged in" violation of the law, as policy documents are permitted to do.112
The key is whether the agency retains discretion despite the document: if the
document significantly limits agency discretion, then the agency is treating it as
binding.1 3 The way the agency treats the document can overcome the
document's language; courts have repeatedly ignored agency disclaimers that the
documents are policy statements. 14 Finally, while courts owe agency
characterizations of their own documents some deference," 5 this deference has
in some cases transformed into outright "suspicio[n]."' 16 No evidence of how
OCR treats the 2017 Q&A in the field yet exists, but an analysis of how the
Obama-era guidance documents would have fared is instructive.
OCR has published none of the three documents in the Code of Federal
Regulations. This is a signal that it does not view the documents as binding, as
well as a factor in the D.C. Circuit's test for whether a rule is interpretive or
legislative. 1 7 Instead, OCR communicated the documents by publishing the
documents online118 and sending them to relevant school officials. Here,
however, is where the Obama-era documents and the 2017 Q&A diverge. OCR
had several years of work with the Obama-era documents, but the 2017 Q&A is
too recent for OCR to have used it in any enforcement actions. In that respect, it
is once again more difficult to challenge on administrative procedure grounds
than the Obama-era guidance.
Whether the Obama OCR acted in its investigations as though the its
guidance documents were binding is extremely controversial.1 19 Several critics,
most prominently Professors Suk and Gersen, claim that OCR acted as if the
guidance documents were binding.1 2 0 However, most of the evidence that Suk
and Gersen cite is in fact how schools were acting,12 1 writing that "[a]s a result,
111. Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1021 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
112. See Prof'ls and Patients for Customized Care v. Shalala, 56 F.3d 592, 600 (5th Cir. 1995).
113. See Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
114. See, e.g., Appalachian Power Co., 208 F.3d at 1022-23.
115. See, e.g., Cmty. Nutrition Institute, 818 F.2d at 946.
116. United States v. Texas, 809 F.3d 134, 171 (5th Cir. 2015), affirmed by an equally divided Court, 136
S.Ct. 2271 (2016).
117. Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
118. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 21, AT 6 n.23.
119. See, e.g., Jennifer James, We Are Not Done: A Federally CodifiedEvidentiary Standard Is Necessary
for College SexualAssault Adjudication, 65 DEPAUL L. REv. 1321, 1341-42 (2016); Corey R. Yung,
Is Relying on Title IXa Mistake?, 64 U. KAN. L. REV. 891, 898-99 (2016); Gersen & Suk, supra
note 7, at 909; Ellis, supra note 97, at 81.
120. Gersen & Suk, supra note 7, at 909.
121. E.g., id. at 908 n.127 (citing Janet Napolitano, President of the University of California), 909 ("all
universities have complied").
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the agency achieved compliance with its nonbinding guidance document."1 22
While it is true that OCR enjoyed some success in getting schools to cooperate,
it is not clear that this was because OCR was treating its documents as binding.
It is possible that schools believed that a court would have sided with OCR's
interpretation, or that the cost of litigation would have been too high. It is equally
possible-in fact, probable-that schools would have been unwilling to fight a
well-publicized court battle over campus sexual violence, as Suk and Gersen
acknowledge.' 2 3 Again, a court would not have analyzed the actions of regulated
parties, but of the agency itself.
Importantly, there is no evidence that OCR "bound itself"l 2 4 with its
guidance documents. To the contrary, documentation of OCR investigations
show that OCR relied on myriad factors in determining whether to bring
enforcement actions.1 25 To be sure, the guidance documents "channel[ed]"
agency discretion, as courts of appeals allow non-legislative rules to do.1 2 6 "[A]ll
statements of policy channel discretion to some degree," one court
acknowledged. 12 7 To be a legislative rule, the document must "remove[] all, if
not most" agency discretion.1 28 OCR never went so far.
It is important to note that a critical category of evidence is not available. In
analyzing whether an agency document is a legislative rule, courts have also
looked to data on actual agency enforcement.129 Because no investigation of
campus sexual violence has ever passed the voluntary resolution stage, there
have been no hearings before the agency to withdraw federal funding. At the
resolution stage-where all campus sexual violence complaints to date have
ended-it is impossible to separate the agency's treatment of the guidance from
the school's treatment of the guidance.
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, courts' deference to agency
characterization of the document should prevail. Of course, the last court of
122. Id. at 909.
123. Id.
124. Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
125. See, e.g., Letter from Alice B. Wender, Reg'1 Office Dir., Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of
Educ., to Gen. J.H. Binford Peay, III, Superintendent, Va. Military Inst., at 8-22 (May 9, 2014),
https://www2.ed.gov/documents/press-releases/vmi-letter.doc [https://perma.cc/B67W-33P3]
(relying on dozens of factors); Letter from Meena Morey Chandra, Reg'I Dir., Office for Civil
Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ., to Michael V. Drake, President, Ohio State Univ., at 9-27 (Sept. 11,
2014), https://www2.ed.gov/documents/press-releases/ohio-state-letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/3LAU
-UPFS] (discussing many factors).
126. Prof'ls and Patients for Customized Care v. Shalala, 56 F.3d 592, 600 (5th Cir. 1995).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See, e.g., U.S. Tel. Ass'n v. FCC, 28 F.2d 1232, 1234 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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appeals to speak on the matter turned "deference" into "suspicio[n],"l 3 0 So it is
not entirely clear how strong-or alive-that presumption is. However, were
evidence to emerge that OCR had begun to treat the 2017 Q&A as binding, a
court could easily find the document in violation of the APA. OCR could
overstep by, for example, telling schools that the documents were binding or
bringing enforcement actions only against schools that did not comply.
Once again, this Article must conclude that while the federal government
most likely has the authority to do what it has done, it is not impossible for a
court to conclude otherwise. At every turn, the conclusion has been the same:
Title IX is most likely constitutional, but a court could disagree. OCR most likely
has not violated the APA, but a court could disagree. These minor uncertainties,
however, pale in the face of the doubt that the Trump Administration would ever
enforce Title IX in favor of survivors.
C. Federal Executive Political Willpower
However well-established it is-and it is a little shaky-federal authority to
act will be completely irrelevant if there is no federal willingness to act. Federal
willpower is critical because federal enforcement depends entirely on threats to
withdraw federal funding. Before the Obama Administration cracked down,
schools were essentially free from government oversight. The past few years'
progress has been due in great part to the Obama Administration's publicization
of schools under investigation and threats to defund."' If the Trump
Administration decides to stop these efforts, schools will face no federal pressure
to comply with Title IX.
Hopes of federal enforcement of Title IX under the Trump Administration
are dim. Unlike President Obama, who identifies as a feminist,1 3 2 and Vice
President Joe Biden, who authored the Violence Against Women Act,1 3 3
President Trump and Vice President Pence are not known for their support for
sex equality. In fact, then-candidate Trump's campaign was nearly derailed when
130. United States v. Texas, 809 F.3d 134, 171 (5th Cir. 2015), affirmed by an equally divided Court, 136
S.Ct. 2271 (2016).
131. See, e.g., Sexual Assault on Campus: Working to Ensure Student Safety: Hearing Before the U.S.
Senate Comm. On Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 113th Cong. 4 (2014) (statement of
Lhamon, Catherine E., Assistant Sec'y, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ.), https:/www
.help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Lhamon.pdf [https://perma.cc/T3PP-PAF9].
132. Barack Obama, President Obama Says, "This Is What a Feminist Looks Like ", GLAMOUR, Aug. 4,
2016, 8:00 AM, http://www.glamour.com/story/glamour-exclusive-president-barack-obama-says-
this-is-what-a-feminist-looks-like [https://perma.cc/7CV3-KUFX].
133. About Vice President Biden's Efforts to End Violence Against Women, WHITE HOUSE, https:/l
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/1 is2many/about [https://perma.cc/4R48-R2DF] (last visited Dec. 1,
2017).
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a video of him bragging about committing sexual assault went viral.1 3 4 Trump
has not commented on campus sexual violence, but his opinion on workplace
sexual harassment is that the victim should quit.1 3 5 One might conclude that he
thinks survivors of campus sexual violence ought to transfer schools rather than
seek the expulsion of their attackers. More specific to campus sexual violence,
President Trump has suggested defunding OCR entirely.1 36 His surrogates have
argued that campuses should not adjudicate campus sexual violence at all.,37 One
called OCR "absolute nonsense." 138 The Republican Party platform calls for an
end to federal "micromanage[ment]" of campus sexual violence.1 39 And the
chairman of the Republican Freedom Caucus has included the DCL on his list of
regulations he recommends rescinding.140
Student-survivor activists have been suspicious of Trump's Secretary of
Education, DeVos, since she emerged as a candidate for the Cabinet.141 Before
her nomination, she donated to a group whose mission was to overturn the
DCL.142 And in her confirmation hearing, she opined that schools need not
follow federal disability-rights law, because "that is best left to the states."1 4 3
DeVos's view on disability law suggests she either believes campus sexual
violence is also a matter for the states-or that, in the event OCR continues to
enforce Title IX, it will neglect students with disabilities. More recently, DeVos
has made her opposition to her predecessors' positions on campus sexual
134. See, e.g., Mathis-Lilley, supra note 10.
135. Amy D. Sorkin, Ivanka Trump and the Question ofSexual Harassment, NEW YORKER, Aug. 3,2016,
http://www.newyorker.com/news/amy-davidson/ivanka-trump-and-the-question-of-sexual-
harassment/ [https://perma.cc/M84P-45U4].
136. See Joel Anderson, Education Civil Rights Advocates Fear "Horror Show" Under Trump,
BUZZFEED, Dec. 20,2016, 5:32 PM, https://www.buzzfeed.com/joelanderson/education-civil-rights
-advocates-fear-horror-show-under-trum [https://perma.cc/Q5GN-4F75].
137. Bitar et al., supra note 10.
138. Id.
139. REPUBLICAN PARTY, REPUBLICAN PLATFORM 2016 35 (2016), https://prod-cdn-static.gop.com
/media/documents/DRAFT_12_FINAL[1]-ben_1468872234.pdf_[https://perma.cc/PQ7Z-B6ZA].
140. Paul Singer, Rep. Meadows Targets Campus Rape Rule as Unfair to 'Often-InnocentAccused', USA
TODAY, Dec. 30, 2016, 10:56 AM, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2016/12/ 3 0/rep-
meadows-targets-campus-rape-rule/95937320/ [https://perma.cc/KXC5-GHX9]; OFFICE OF
CONGRESSMAN MARK MEADOWS, RULES, REGULATIONS, AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS TO EXAMINE,
REVOKE, AND ISSUE 5 (2016), https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B-c5aMEjqMlBek56UVByQOISS
ms/view [https://perma.cc/P9ZJ-73ZD].
141. Molly Redden & Sabrina Siddiqui, Betsy DeVos Hearing Prompts Fearsfor Campus SexualAssault




143. Elliot Hannon, DeVos Says States Shouldn't Have to Comply with Federal Law Protecting Disabled
Students, SLATE, Jan. 17, 2017, http://www.slate.com/blogs/theslatest/2017/01/17/devos says
states don t have to comply_withfederallaw protecting disabled.html [https://perma.cc
/B2B5-JUV2].
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violence clearer. In a speech in September 2017, she announced that the old
system "has clearly pushed schools to overreach." 144 The agency is beginning a
notice-and-comment period for new regulations; given DeVos's view that the
current system has swung too far in favor of survivors,145 the new regulations
will no doubt make it more difficult for schools to punish students they determine
responsible. For survivors and activists who believe it is still all too unlikely for
an assault to be reported, let alone seriously investigated or punished, DeVos's
path looks like undoing years of hard-won progress.1 4 6
One level down, there is more to alarm survivors and their allies. The new
head of OCR, Candice Jackson, is not a pick to raise their hopes. 14 7 Jackson has
said publicly that "ninety percent" of campus sexual assault accusations "fall into
the category of 'we were both drunk,' 'we broke up, and six months later I found
myself under a Title IX investigation because she just decided that our last
sleeping together was not quite right."' 1 4 8 Even if Ms. Jackson has since
apologized, it is deeply unfortunate for the head of OCR to repeat outdated
stereotypes, including that most women lie about being attacked. 14 9
Student activism and private litigation will no doubt continue. But in the
likely absence of federal pressure, states will remain the only governmental
actors capable of ensuring schools protect students from campus sexual violence.
This Article therefore turns to an analysis of states' authority to act.
II. STATE AUTHORITY TO GOVERN CAMPUS SEXUAL VIOLENCE
As this Article has established, the federal government is unlikely to
continue enforcing survivor protections under Title IX. Even if there were federal
willpower, there are weaknesses in Title IX and OCR's interpretation thereof for
challengers to attack. With the federal government unwilling or unable to protect
students from campus sexual violence, states should step in. The question
144. Svrluga, supra note 74.
145. Id. ("Through intimidation and coercion, the failed system has clearly pushed schools to overreach.
With the heavy hand of Washington tipping the balance of her scale, the sad reality is that Lady
Justice is not blind on campuses today.").
146. See, e.g., Dana Bolger & Alexandra Brodsky, Betsy DeVos's Title IX Interpretation Is an Attack on
Sexual Assault Survivors, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news
/posteverything/wp/2017/09/08/betsy-devoss-title-ix-interpretation-is-an-attack-on-sexual-assault-
survivors/ [https://perma.ce/WVX9-38DW].
147. Erica L. Green & Sheryl G. Stolberg, Campus Rape Policies Get a New Look as the Accused Get
De Vos 'sEar, N.Y. TIMES, July 12,2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/12/us/politics/campus-
rape-betsy-devos-title-iv-education-trump-candice-jackson.html [https://perma.cc/VVQ2-UQ8U].
148. Id.
149. Alexandra Wilts, Trump Official Apologises for Suggesting 90% of Campus Rape Accusations Are
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therefore becomes whether states have the authority to legislate in this area. In
brief, the answer is that states are empowered to legislate on campus sexual
violence, and that they may do so as long as their legislation does not conflict
with Title IX. This Part sets out states' authority and discusses the preemptive
effect of Title IX; its regulations; and most importantly, the 2017 Q&A.
State authority to legislate on campus sexual violence is difficult to attack."'o
Both education and physical safety are traditional state concerns, despite
significant federal ventures into education. 51 The only real potential barrier to
state action is preemption, and preemption merely prevents states from acting in
conflict with Title IX. States remain free to legislate on campus sexual assault as
long as they do not raise obstacles to Title IX compliance or violate individual
constitutional rights.
The federal government can preempt state legislation in two ways: field
preemption or conflict preemption.1 5 2 The more powerful of these, field
preemption, is rare, and occurs only when Congress "occupies an entire field."153
Courts find field preemption only where Congress has manifested an intent to
block state legislation. 5 4 There is no evidence of field preemption in Title IX,
meaning any preemptive power must be under conflict preemption. Under this
doctrine, state legislation is "naturally preempted" whenever it conflicts with
federal law. 55 Conflict preemption thus prevents states from legislating only
where the state law would conflict with Title IX.
The preemptive effect of policy guidance like the 2017 Q&A is more
complex, because the agency's interpretation in a guidance document is not
binding, and therefore not necessarily preemptive. In determining whether the
2017 Q&A preempts state law, a court would have to decide which level of
deference is due to the agency's interpretation-Chevron or its less-deferent
analogue, Skidmore. Regulations share the preemptive power of statutes.' 56 OCR
regulations under Title IX are therefore also preemptive. Guidance, by contrast,
does not qualify for preemption-the 2017 Q&A is therefore not preemptive. 57
This does not necessarily mean that a state could, for example, require all its
150. The Tenth Amendment flips the inquiry: where the federal government must anchor its authority in
an enumerated power, states are presumed to have the power to act unless the Constitution says
otherwise. See U.S. CONST. AMEND. X.
151. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 580 (1995) ("it is well established that education is a
traditional concern of the States"); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996) (explaining
that health and safety are traditional state powers).
152. See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000).
153. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S.Ct. 2492, 2502 (2012).
154. Id.
155. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 372.
156. See Fid. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n. v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982).
157. See supra Part I.B.
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universities to use a different standard of evidence than the 2017 Q&A permits-
it merely means that a court would have to decide whether that evidentiary
standard was in conflict with Title IX, without Chevron deference to OCR's
interpretation.158 In so deciding, a court would likely accord the guidance
Skidmore deference. Under Skidmore, courts give a greater amount of deference
to agency interpretations that speak from the agency's expertise,1 5 9 are
thoroughly considered, 16 0 and do not conflict with prior interpretations.'1 6 The
2014 Q&A, and to a greater extent the DCL, were good candidates for Skidmore
deference. As longstanding policies developed with OCR's expertise, they neatly
checked the Skidmore boxes. The 2017 Q&A, by contrast, is not longstanding,
and is thus less likely to merit Skidmore deference.
Finally, states are within their authority to provide protection beyond what
Title IX demands-again, assuming their requirements do not conflict with Title
IX. Generally speaking, courts view federal law as a floor, not a ceiling, and
allow states to legislate more protectively. 162 When it comes to campus
adjudication, this could be more complicated than it sounds, given the balancing
act between the rights of the accuser and the accused. However, states are free to
go above and beyond other Title IX requirements, such as by requiring a higher
standard of consent or by mandating additional rape-prevention measures.
As of 2017, only a minority of states have exercised their authority to
legislate or regulate campus sexual violence.' 63 All told, twenty-one states have
acted. Of these, nineteen passed legislation, one acted administratively, and one
acted both legislatively and administratively. The next Part analyzes what states
have done, comparing the different responses to draw broader conclusions about
how states should address campus sexual violence.
158. See Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) ("Here, however, we confront an
interpretation contained in an opinion letter, not one arrived at after, for example, a formal
adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking. Interpretations such as those in opinion letters-
like interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all
of which lack the force of law-do not warrant Chevron-style deference.").
159. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 268 (2006) (refusing to accord deference in part because the
interpretation was beyond the Attorney General's expertise).
160. Id.
161. U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 235 (2001) (listing a particular interpretation's "fit with prior
interpretations" as a reason for it to be accorded Skidmore deference).
162. See Ferebee v. Chevron Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1543 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
163. For a partial accounting, see ANDREW MORSE ET AL., NASPA, STATE LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
ON CAMPUS SEXUAL VIOLENCE: ISSUES IN THE CONTEXT OF SAFETY [hereinafter
"NASPA Report"] 6 fig.1 (Dec. 2015), http://naspa.org/images/uploads/main/ECSNASPA
BRIEFDOWNLOAD3.pdf [https://perma.cc/T3JF-F65X]. For the remainder, see infra note 165.
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III. CURRENT STATE LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 16 4
Having established that states can act to protect their students from campus
sexual violence, this Article proceeds by analyzing extant state action. This
completes a brief survey of all state work, noting where states fall on the
spectrum from survivor-protective to accused-protective (see Figure 1). Next,
this Part focuses on Illinois and Georgia as examples of state action on campus
sexual violence. Procedurally and substantively, the Illinois and Georgia
responses are very different-Illinois's legislation followed months of
community dialogue that emphasized student voices. Georgia, by contrast, had a
rushed administrative response to a single state congressman's personal
campaign against a particular university. Student voices were all but shut out
entirely. This Article analyzes those two states' responses and concludes that
states should involve all stakeholders. Only by engaging in dialogue with diverse
interest groups will states succeed in legislation that addresses the concerns of
not just politicians, but also the students who must live under the new regime.
Most critically, states must ensure that their legislation pays attention to different









Figure 1. States with legislation protecting college students from campus sexual violence.
Twenty-one states have regulated campus sexual violence within their
borders: Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois,
Indiana, Louisiana, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, Washington,
164. This Part is current as of October 2017.
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and Wisconsin. 16 5 State action differs in several key respects, both substantively
and procedurally. Except for Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, and New
York, states have legislated on just a few topics related to campus sexual assault,
and the vast majority of legislation has targeted only public universities.1 6 6 Other
states have created comprehensive schemes for universities, regulating issues
from the definition of consent, to campus adjudication procedures, to
preventative education. Only Georgia, however, has acted in a purely regulatory
manner, without accompanying legislation. As this Part will show, the procedure
the states use-and not just the substance of their response-impacts the
protections survivors can seek from their schools.
1. State Legislation on Specific Topics
With the exception of a few comprehensive responses, state legislation on
campus sexual violence addresses one or more of five distinct issues: affirmative
consent, the role of law enforcement, transcript notations, the role of attorneys,
and school policies.! 67 This Section notes each state that has legislated on campus
sexual violence but does not exhaustively document each provision. Instead, this
Section addresses the more common state responses, leaving out, for example,
the relatively rare requirement that schools cooperate with local rape crisis
centers 68 or that they protect survivors' confidentiality.1 6 9 Where relevant, states
that have legislated comprehensively will also be discussed in the issue-specific
Sections. Because Louisiana has taken both legislative and administrative steps,
it is discussed throughout. Table 1 provides a summary.
165. The NASPA Report documents some of these, but does not cover regulation in Connecticut,
Delaware, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, New Jersey, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas or Washington.
See generally NASPA Report, supra note 163. For Connecticut, see CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10a-55m
(2016). For Delaware, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, §§ 9002A, 9004A (2017). For Georgia, see BD.
OF REGENTS OF THE UNIV. SYS. OF GA., POLICY MANUAL [hereinafter "Georgia BOR Policy"]
§ 4.1.7 (2017), available at http://www.usg.edu/policymanual/section4/C327/#p4.1.7 sexual
misconduct_policy at [https://perma.cc/VS2M-WMCT]. For Indiana, see IND. CODE §§ 35-37-6-9,
35-27-6-2.7, 35-27-6-3.5 (establishing victim's rights in "any judicial, legislative, or administrative
proceeding") (2008-16). For Louisiana, see LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:3399.11-15 (2015). For New
Jersey, see S. 2812, 216th Leg. (N.J. 2015), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2014/Bills
/S3000/2812 _II.pdf [https://perma.cc/T66G-3K42]. For Oregon, see OR. REV. STAT. §§ 40.264
(2015) (amended 2017); 350.255 (2016). For Rhode Island, see R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-76-1 to -3
(2016). For South Carolina, see S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-105-40 (2016). For Texas, see TEX. EDUC.
CODE ANN. § 51.9366 (West 2017). For Washington, see WASH. REV. CODE §§ 28B. 112.005-30
(2015). For Wisconsin, see WIS. STAT. § 125.07 (2017).
166. See infra Section III.A.1.
167. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-60-109 (2015); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67386 (West2016); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 10a-55m (2016); HAW. REV. STAT. § 304A-120 (2017); MINN. STAT. § 135A.15 (2017);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 166-40.11 (2013); N.D. CENT. CODE §15-10-56 (2015); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-
105-40 (2002); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 23.1-806 to -808 (2016).
168. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67386(13)(c) (West 2016).
169. See, e.g., IND. CODE §§ 35-37-6-9, 35-27-6-2.7, 35-37-6-3.5 (2016).
2018] 397
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
i. Affirmative Consent
Affirmative consent is the concept that only a clear agreement to a sexual
encounter constitutes consent. Specifically, an affirmative-consent requirement
declares that "only yes means yes" in a sexual encounter. The default
understanding, in the absence of affirmative consent, is merely that "no means
no." Affirmative consent transforms silence, or any ambiguous response, into
"no." As such, affirmative-consent requirements are survivor-protective: they
put a burden on people initiating a sexual encounter to seek consent, as opposed
to allowing a lack of refusal to mean consent.
In 2014, California became the first state to mandate an affirmative consent
standard in all schools receiving state financial assistance.170 The legislation
sparked a wave of debate; affirmative consent has proved a controversial topic
beyond just the education setting. 171 Connecticut and New York have since
required affirmative consent in state-funded schools. 1 72 Hawaii has created a task
force to study the matter.1 73 Perhaps because of the controversy surrounding
affirmative consent, no other states have legislated in this area.
Table 1. Summary of states' legislative initiatives.
Affirmative Role of Law Transcript Explicit Right to School Policy
consent Enforcement Notations Representation Requirements
(survivor- (neutral) (survivor- (accused- (survivor-
protective) protective) protective) protective)
Required: Memoranda of * Virginia For accuser and Policy required:
* California understanding: * New York accused: * California
* Connecticut * Louisiana * North Dakota * Connecticut
* New York * Minnesota * Arkansas * Illinois
* Virginia * Minnesota
Task force to * New York For accused only * New York
study issue: * North Carolina * Rhode Island
* Hawaii Reporting * South Carolina
threshold: * Virginia
* New York
* Virginia Minimum policy
requirement:
170. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67386 (a)(1) (West 2016).
171. See, e.g., Amanda Marcotte, Do Not Fear Cahfornia's New Affirmative Consent Law, SLATE, Sept.
29, 2014, 1:52 PM, http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx-factor/2014/09/29/affirmative-consent-in
california-gov jerry brown_signsthe yesmeansyes.htfml [https://perma.cc/K5KA-D8SF];
Robert Carle, How Affirmative Consent Laws Criminalize Everyone, FEDERALIST, http://
thefederalist.com/2015/03/30/how-affirmative-consent-laws-criminalize-everyone/ [https://perma
.cc/UT3Q-YDLE ] (last visited Oct. 19, 2017).
172. CONN. GEN STAT. ANN. § 10a-55m(b)(1) (2016);N.Y. EDUC. L. § 6441 (McKinney 2015).
173. For the Task Force's latest report, see AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT TASK FORCE, REPORT OF ACT 222
AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT TASK FORCE (2017), http://www.hawaii.edu/govrel/docs/reports/2017
/act222-slh2015_2017_affirmative-consent report.pdf [https://perma.cc/N99R-T2VM].
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Accuser's Right * California
to Decide to * Illinois
Report: * Minnesota
* Delaware * New York
* Minnesota * South Carolina
* New York
* Illinois Review process:
*_Connecticut
ii. The Role of Law Enforcement
The role of law enforcement in campus sexual violence is also critical to
survivors. Title IX advocates argue that campus sexual violence is a matter best
addressed by schools, not law enforcement. 174 Schools can move more quickly
than law enforcement and can thus provide survivors with immediate support.175
Additionally, survivors often seek support that law enforcement cannot provide.
For example, in one high-profile case, a survivor wanted permission to take food
out of the dining hall, because her attacker often found her in the dining hall.176
Other responses that schools can provide include dormitory assignment changes
and class changes. 17 7 Requiring law enforcement to resolve the matter before
allowing schools to act would be excessively protective of the accused: it would
not only slow down the process considerably, but would ensure that accused
students enjoy the full due process requirements of the criminal justice system.
Student-survivors and their allies respond that students on campus are not
entitled to so many protections, where their liberty is not at stake. 178 At any rate,
no state has yet gone so far as to require schools to wait to respond until the
conclusion of a criminal matter.
Reporting to law enforcement is an aspect of the role of law enforcement
that many states have addressed. Requiring school officials to report campus
174. See, e.g., Sarah L. Swan, Between Title IX and the Criminal Law: Bringing Tort Law to the Campus
Sexual Assault Debate, 64 U. KAN. L. REv. 963, 963-64 (2016) (describing the debate).
175. Academic disciplinary investigations are not held to the slow pace of the courts. For further
discussion on this topic, see Why Schools Handle Sexual Violence Reports, KNow YOUR IX,
https://www.knowyourix.org/issues/schools-handle-sexual-violence-reports/ [https://perma.cc
/2E9D-AT5S].
176. Patrick Yeagle, Battling Rape on Campus, ILL. TIMES, May 7, 2015, 12:01 AM, http://illinoistimes
.com/article-15444-battling-rape-on-campus.html [https://perma.cc/X542-R28A]; Edith Brady-




177. See Nancy C. Cantalupo, For the Title IX Civil Rights Movement: Congratulations and Cautions,
125 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 281, 294 (2016).
178. See id. at 286.
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sexual violence to law enforcement does not protect the accused in any direct
way, but it can deter reporting. 17 9 Critically, mandatory reporting provisions have
an outsized impact on survivors from marginalized groups, for example,
undocumented students, or students of color, who are often skeptical of law
enforcement.180
Seven state legislatures have addressed the question of what role law
enforcement should play in campus sexual violence: California, Louisiana,
Minnesota, New York, and Virginia, and, to an extent, Delaware and Illinois.
The most common requirement is memoranda of understanding between schools
and law enforcement. California and Virginia have both mandated that schools
report an assault to law enforcement if its "severity" rises above a set threshold.
Louisiana, Minnesota, and Virginia have neutral legislation requiring
schools to enter into memoranda of understanding with local law enforcement
under certain circumstances.' 8 1 California requires reporting to local law
enforcement for some forms of sexual violence.1 82 Virginia requires reporting
where reporting is necessary to protect the health or safety of the student or
others. Further, where the alleged act would constitute a felony, Virginia requires
a consultation with a prosecutor, in which identifiable information may or may
not be disclosed.183
Finally, in survivor-protective iterations of campus sexual assault
legislation, Delaware, Illinois, Minnesota, and New York allow survivors to
choose whether to report to law enforcement. 18 4
iii. Transcript Notations
Another legislative response is to require notations on the transcripts of
students found responsible of campus sexual violence. Such requirements are
survivor-protective because they add a deterrent to campus sexual violence and
may hinder recidivism. When a student is found responsible of campus sexual
violence, in many cases, that student can apply to another school and transfer
179. Open Letter from Kevin Kruger, President, NASPA: Student Affairs Adm'rs in Higher Educ., to
Elected Leaders of the 50 United States, https://www.naspa.org/images/uploads/main/Joint
omnibusbillstatementletterhead.pdf_[https://perma.cc/S35S-D47T].
180. See, e.g., JON C. ROGOWSKI & CATHY J. COHEN, BLACK YOUTH PROJECT, BLACK MILLENNIALS IN
AMERICA 34 (2014), available at https://blackyouthproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/1 1/BYP-
millenials-report-10-27-15-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/KF9P-KTXR] (reporting that only 44.2%
of Black youth trust the police, whereas 59.6% of Latino youth and 71.5% of white youth do).
181. LA. STAT. ANN. § 17:3399.14(A) (2015); MINN. STAT. § 135A.15 Subd. 4. (2017); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 23.1-815(D) (2016).
182. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 67380(a) (West 2017).
183. VA. CODE ANN. § 23.1-806(F)-(G) (2016).
184. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 9002A (2017); MINN. STAT. § 135A.15 Subd. 2(3); N.Y. EDUC. LAW
§ 6443 (McKinney 2015).
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without the second school ever learning of the finding. Transcript notations allow
schools to protect their students by refusing to admit the predatory student.
Only two states require transcript notations when students are found
responsible for campus sexual assault, or withdraw from school. while an
investigation is pending. Virginia has set a statewide policy, whereas New York
has created a minimum requirement and allowed schools to develop their own
additional policies.
Virginia's law is specific to sexual violence.! 85 It requires schools to
"include a prominent notation" that a student was suspended or expelled for
sexual violence. 18 6 Moreover, schools must annotate transcripts where students
withdrew from school during an investigation for sexual violence. 87 The law
also specifies a procedure for removing such notations.188
New York's bill is broader, requiring notations for any offense that meets
the Clery Act's reporting requirements, although it specifies that it includes
offenses of sexual violence. 189 Similar to Virginia, New York requires transcript
notations for suspension, expulsion, or withdrawal, but leaves some flexibility to
schools to create a procedure for removing transcript notations. 190
iv. Rights of the Accused to Legal Representation
Some states require schools to allow accused students to have legal
representation in campus proceedings. Some of these accused-protective laws go
further than others in their requirements for campus proceedings.
Three states have legislated on the role of attorneys in campus sexual
violence adjudications, all in accused-protective ways. North Dakota students
and student groups now have a right to be represented by an attorney or
"nonattorney advocate" in campus adjudications that could result in suspension
or expulsion. 191 Interestingly, the law exempts adjudications for academic
misconduct 92; apparently, the North Dakota legislature trusts schools to provide
fair process in plagiarism hearings, but not for campus sexual assault. The right
extends through appeals and specifies that advisors can "fully participate" in any
185. VA. CODE ANN. § 23.1-900(B) (2016).
186. Id.
187. Id
188. Id. § 23.1-900(C).
189. N.Y. EDUC. L. § 6444(6) (McKinney 2015).
190. Id.
191. N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-10-56(1)-(2) (2015).
192. Id. § 15-10-56(1).
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proceeding, which includes cross-examining witnesses and making
statements. 193
Arkansas's legislation is practically identical to North Dakota's, providing
for a right to an attorney or "non-attorney advocate," who may "fully participate"
in any disciplinary proceeding that could result in suspension or expulsion,
except for academic "dishonesty" hearings. 19 4 Unlike North Dakota, Arkansas
does not define "fully participate." The only other major difference is that where
North Dakota addresses the rights of both students and student groups, Arkansas
is directed only to individual students. 9 5
Finally, North Carolina has provided a right of representation for both
students and student organizations. 9 North Carolina also has the exception for
academic dishonesty hearings, but adds another for "Student Honor Court[s]."1 9 7
North Carolina does not specify that this right extends to the accuser as well as
the accused, but it also does not state that the accuser does not have the right to
representation.
v. School Policy Requirements
Finally, some states set out requirements for their schools' policies. As a
general matter, setting minima for school policies is neither survivor- nor
accused-protective. But practically speaking, all of the policies--except for
Georgia's, discussed in the next Section-are survivor-protective in their
particulars.
Several states' legislation also addresses requirements for school sexual
misconduct policies. California, Connecticut, Illinois, Minnesota, New York,
Oregon, South Carolina, and Virginia require schools to create or publicize
campus sexual violence policies.' 98 Louisiana has delegated to its Board of
Regents the task of creating a policy for state-funded schools.' 99 Several states
have minimum requirements; Connecticut has uniquely provided a procedure by
which experts and students must review campus policies.200
193. Id. § 15-10-56(3)(b), 56(5).
194. ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-60-109 (2015).
195. See id.
196. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 116-40.11(a)-(b) (2015).
197. Id. § 116-40.11(a)(1).
198. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67386(a)(13)(d) (West 2016); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10a-55m(a)(9)(b) (2016);
110 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 155/10 (2016); MINN. STAT. § 135A.15 Subd. 1(b) (2017); N.Y. EDUC. L.
§ 6440(1)(a), (4) (McKinney 2015); OR. REV. STAT. § 350.255 (2016); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-105-
40(A), (D) (2016); VA. CODE ANN. § 23.1-808 (2016).
199. LA STAT. ANN. § 17:3399.15 (2015).
200. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10a-55n (2014).
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California, Illinois, Minnesota, New York, and South Carolina have
minimum requirements for policies. 20 1 These requirements generally involve the
form or timing of adjudication and often enumerate victims' rights. Minnesota,
for example, has a provision dedicated entirely to victims' rights, including the
right to notice of the adjudication's outcome, and to protection "from unwanted
contact with the alleged assailant." 202 California's policy, by contrast, focuses on
adjudication, mandating preponderance of the evidence, and specifying that
certain excuses are not valid.203 Illinois specifies notice requirements and goes
into some detail about the minimum standard of consent, having declined to
require affirmative consent.20 4
Connecticut has a unique review procedure for its schools' policies. Its act
requires schools to form "campus resource team[s]," which must include, for
example, a student, a member of the school's women's center, a school
counselor, and the school's Title IX coordinator. 20 5 These campus resource teams
must be trained on both federal law and on how to "communicat[e] sensitively
and compassionately with victims of [sexual] assault." 206 Following such
training, the campus resource teams are responsible for reviewing their schools'
policies and recommending changes.207 While Connecticut does not require, for
example, a member of the school's disability office to be on these teams, it does
require that schools hear from more diverse actors than school administrators
alone.
2. Comprehensive State Legislation
Only Connecticut, Illinois, Louisiana, and New York have gone further and
enacted comprehensive schemes, all of which are survivor-protective.
Connecticut, Illinois, and New York have purely legislative schemes, but
Louisiana combined legislative and regulatory action. Georgia's scheme is
entirely regulatory and will be discussed in the next Section. These schemes
address definitions of consent, rights of survivors, reporting mechanisms,
adjudication procedures, and requirements for school policies. 2 0 8 Some set a
201. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67386; 110 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 155/10; MINN. STAT. § 135A.15 Subd. 2; S.C.
CODE ANN. § 59-105-40; N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6440.
202. MINN. STAT. § 135A.15 Subd. 2.
203. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67386(a).
204. ILL. COMP. STAT. § 155/10.
205. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10a-55n(a) (2014).
206. Id. § 10a-55n(c).
207. Id. § 10a-55n(d).
208. See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 17:3399.15 (2015) (laying out requirements for the Board of Regents
relating to reporting and adjudication); N.Y. EDUC. L. § 6441 (McKinney 2015) (addressing
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statewide policy; others, only a floor upon which schools can build.2 09 This
Section focuses on Illinois's legislation, which is among the most
comprehensive.
Drafted by the Office of Attorney General Lisa Madigan, Illinois's campus
sexual violence law is part of her campaign to combat sexual violence in Illinois.
210 Critically, Madigan sought input from the broader community: the legislation
was influenced by three summits.2 1 1 Held in different areas of the state, the
summits invited campus officials, police, survivors, and student groups to learn
about the legislation.212 OCR representatives were also present.213 Survivors'
voices were emphasized throughout the drafting process: a survivor was the
keynote speaker at each summit.2 14 This is not to say that the process was perfect.
There is no evidence that the summits focused on marginalized communities at
any point, and the legislation does not specifically address the particular needs
of these communities. However, Illinois may be the state that has made the
greatest effort to respond to the needs and preferences articulated by survivors
and other key actors in its campus sexual violence legislation.
The resulting legislation sets a floor for Illinois schools.215 Illinois schools
must develop their own policies; if they comply with required minima, states
have the freedom to set their own definition of consent, their own reporting and
adjudication procedures, and their own sanctions.2 1 6 State minima are relatively
strict. For example, although Illinois does not require affirmative consent, its
minimum definition of consent includes provisions that consent can be
withdrawn at any time, and that a person's clothing does not constitute
definitions of consent); ILL. COMP. STAT. § 155/10 (2016) (addressing definitions of consent and
requirements for school policies).
209. Louisiana created minimum requirements in its law but a system-wide policy in its BOR Policy. See
LA. BD. OF REGENTS, UNIFORM POLICY ON SEXUAL MISCONDUCT (2015), available at http://
www.regents.1a.gov/assets/docs/PRAA/BORSexualMisconductPolicyActl72FINALAugust24.pdf
[https://perma.cc/76Z4-Z7H5]. New York and Connecticut created minimum requirements for
school-specific policies. N.Y. EDUC. L. § 6440 (McKinney 2015); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10a-55m
(2016).
210. Press Release, Ill. Attorney Gen. Lisa Madigan, Madigan Announces Department of Justice Grant
to Improve Response to Sexual Assault Crimes in Illinois (Oct. 5, 2016), http://www.ag.state.il.us
/pressroom/2016_10/20161005.html [https://perma.cc/PG29-XGPP).
211. Press Release, Ill. Attorney Gen. Lisa Madigan, Madigan Hosts Summit on Campus Sexual
Violence, Announces Bill to Strengthen Schools' Response to Incidents (Mar. 23, 2015), http://www
.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressroom/2015_03/20150323.html_[https://perma.cc/T5C4-FVSY].
212. Id.
213. See Madigan Brings Sexual Assault Summit to SIUE Campus, S. ILL. UNIV. EDWARDSVILLE, Apr.
27, 2015, 4:07 PM, https://www.siue.edulnews/2015/04/MadiganBringsSexualAssaultSummitto
SIUECampus.shtml [https://perma.cc/HTD6-55TD].
214. See id.
215. See 110 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 155/10-30 (2015).
216. See id. § 155/10.
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consent. 2 17 Illinois is more survivor-protective than many states, giving survivors
the right to decide whether to report. 218 While there is no evidence that this
provision was driven by concerns for students from marginalized communities
who may be especially deterred from reporting by mandatory reporting
provisions, the resulting legislation accounts for these students' needs in this
respect, at least. Another provision requires that all schools have confidential
advisors, who must undergo continuing sexual violence response training.219
Illinois's legislation not only addresses the survivor's side of the equation,
but also looks to adjudication, balancing the rights of the accuser and the accused.
Schools are left to flesh out the details of their adjudication procedures, but the
state requires certain features, such as a preponderance of the evidence
standard.220 Other provisions include a ban on allowing parties to cross examine
each other directly. 2 2 1
Nothing in Illinois's legislation conflicts with Title IX or OCR's guidance,
allowing schools to comply with both. In fact, Illinois's legislation is in several
ways more protective than Title IX, because it maps Obama-era OCR guidance.
Thus, Illinois schools will effectively continue to operate under the Obama
OCR's policy. 22 2 The same is true for other states' survivor-protective schemes:
in 2018, Connecticut, Illinois, Louisiana, and New York will all continue to
protect survivors on their campuses, regardless of policy change at the federal
level. Such is not the case with Georgia, the subject of the next Section.
B. State Regulation: Georgia
Alone among the states discussed in this Part, Georgia has taken purely
administrative action. The Georgia Board of Regents ("BOR") issued a sexual
misconduct policy, preempting all twenty-nine public higher educational
institutions' own policies.2 23 Unlike in Louisiana, no legislative acts preceded
the BOR's policy or set requirements for it. In fact, the new policy was developed
so quickly that, contrary to standard practice, opponents were not given time to
217. Id. § 155/10(1).
218. Id. § 155/15(a)(1).
219. Id. § 155/20.
220. Id. § 155/25(b)(5).
221. Id. § 155/25(b)(10).
222. See Press Release, Ill. Attorney Gen. Lisa Madigan, Madigan Condemns Action by U.S. Department
of Education Secretary DeVos Scrapping Guidance on Campus Sexual Assault (Sept. 7, 2017),
http://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressroom/2017_09/20170907.html [https://perma.cc
/WR24-F85Y].
223. Georgia BOR Policy, supra note 165, § 4.1.7.
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speak at the BOR full committee meeting in which the policy passed.224 The
resulting document is not only accused-protective, but it also contains at least
one provision that clearly puts Georgia schools at risk of being forced to choose
between violating state law and violating federal law. Events surrounding the
passage of the policy show that the BOR was under pressure to promulgate an
accused-protective policy, because the state congressman in charge of the
subcommittee that controls the BOR's-and all state universities'-funding
wanted to ensure that universities stopped expelling students for rape. This
Section details the events that culminated in the BOR's Policy, and concludes
that states must use transparent procedures and seek stakeholder input in order
to achieve state legislation that does not force schools to risk violating federal
law.
1. Background of the Georgia BOR Policy
Before the state legislature took up the topic of campus sexual violence in
2015 and 2016, the Georgia Institute of Technology ("Georgia Tech") was taking
campus sexual violence very seriously. Following a scandal involving a Georgia
Tech fraternity and rape,2 2 5 the university became perhaps the most aggressive
school in responding to campus sexual violence.226 With the help of student
activists, Georgia Tech created a sexual misconduct policy that required
expulsion to be the "First Considered Sanction" upon a finding of responsibility
for non-consensual sexual intercourse.2 27 The school also sanctioned racial
discrimination, issuing a suspension in abeyance for an entire fraternity for racial
224. Interview with Katherine Napier, student activist, Ga. Inst. of Tech., in Atlanta, Ga. (Jan. 9, 2015)
(on file with author).
225. A fraternity first got into trouble after an email describing female students as "rapebait" was leaked.
Two women then sued, alleging they were raped at the fraternity. See Amanda Hess, Two Lawsuits
Allege Rape at the "Rapebait" Frat House, SLATE, Oct. 31, 2014, 3:32 PM, http://www.slate.com
/blogs/xx factor/2014/10/31/ rapebait fraternitytwolawsuits allege rape. atjthegeorgiatech
phi kappa.html [https://perma.cc/H4GF-G4P5]. The following semester, the Georgia Tech student
newspaper published minutes from fraternity meetings and quoted a letter from the Office of Student
Integrity describing a "deep-rooted culture within the fraternity that is obscene, indecent and
endangers women." OSI Disbands Phi Kappa Tau for Continual Violations, TECHNIQUE, Apr. 4,
2014, http://nique.net/news/2014/04/04/osi-disbands-phi-kappa-tau-for-continual-violations/
[https://perma.cc/329Y-KVR4]. The fraternity was disbanded for three years. Id.
226. See, e.g., Janel Davis & Shannon McCaffrey, Wrongly Accused ofRape? Students Question Their
Expulsions from Tech, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Jan. 16, 2016, http://www.myajc.com/news/local
/wrongly-accused-rape-students-question-their-expulsions-from-tech/BBvnT55EBWtaCHbhunSx
ON/ [https://perma.cc/7L58-2ZUQ].
227. GA. INST. OF TECH., STUDENT MISCONDUCT POLICY (2012) (on file with author); see also Davis &
McCaffrey, supra note 226. The First Considered Sanction was less extreme for other forms of
sexual misconduct. See GA. INST. OF TECH., STUDENT MISCONDUCT POLICY, supra.
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harassment committed by three of its members.22 8 While racial discrimination is
not governed by Title IX, the school adjudicated the incident through similar
procedures to its sexual assault cases, and the racial harassment case became
entwined in the same political scandal that led to the BOR Policy.
In 2015, Georgia Tech expelled two students it found responsible of rape.2 2 9
Not only are multiple such sanctions for rape in one year rare in and of
themselves, but one expulsion was for rape of a gay student.2 30 Although gay
students are victimized at much higher rates than straight students, gay students
report to schools more rarely. 231 The student expelled for this rape claimed he
was being discriminated against as a gay man,23 2 but the outcome of the case at
the university level actually suggests that Georgia Tech was responding to
campus sexual assaults without discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation.
Both expelled students sued. Because Georgia Tech is public, the Georgia
Attorney General took over litigation; he quickly settled.233 However, in neither
case were the findings of responsibility overturned, meaning that both students
remain as having been found responsible of rape. The suspended fraternity also
sought review, claiming that Georgia Tech had violated their due process
rights. 23 4 The combination of these three cases attracted the attention of state
Representative Earl Ehrhart, chair of the House Appropriations Subcommittee
on Higher Education. 2 35 Reviewing the fraternity suspension, a former state
supreme court chief justice ultimately determined the fraternity had received due
228. Davis & McCaffrey, supra note 226. The suspension in abeyance "effectively limit[ed] the fraternity
to academic activities and requir[ed] members to undergo training as a qualification of lifting the
suspension." Id.
229. Compl. at 6, Doe v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. ofGa., 1:15-cv-04354-RWS (Dec. 15, 2015);
Order at 8, Doe, 1:15-cv-04079-SCJ (Dec. 16, 2015). In total, Georgia Tech punished seven students
for rape in or around that same year, but only two sued. Email from Anna Harrison, student activist,
Georgia Institute of Technology, to author (Jan. 15, 2017) (on file with author).
230. Compl. at 3, Doe, 1:15-cv-04354-RWS (Dec. 15, 2015).
231. For a discussion of what drives lower reporting rates, which in turn creates lower chances of
sanction, see Tyler Kingkade, LGBTQIA Students Face More Sexual Harassment and Assault, and
More Trouble Reporting It, HUFFPOST, July 14, 2015, 8:05 AM, http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/entry/LGBTQIA-students-sexual-assaultus_55a332dfe4bOecec7lbc5e6a [https://perma.cc/68T5-
T6B4].
232. Compl. at 3, Doe, 1 :15-cv-04354-RWS (Dec. 15, 2015).
233. See Settlement Agreement, Doe v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 1: 15-cv-04079-SCJ (July
13, 2016); Janel Davis, Georgia Tech Settles Two Lawsuits Involving Sexual Assaults, ATLANTA J.-
CONST., July 25, 2016, http://www.ajc.com/news/local-education/georgia-tech-settles-two-lawsuits
-involving-sexual-assaults/XwVWdp6wATImgaCG3kfrRP/ [https://perma.cc/QJ47-LWCW].
234. Janel Davis & Shannon McCaffrey, Lawmakers Grill Tech Leaders on Student Hearings,
Punishment, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Jan. 25, 2016, http://www.myajc.com/news/local-education
/lawmakers-grill-tech-leaders-student-hearings-punishment/Tmja4LmE1JFWpbMHY2nhMJ/
[https://perma.cc/4ZAM-YTN9].
235. See id; House Appropriations, GEORGIA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://www.house.ga.gov
/Committees/en-US/Committee.aspx?Committee=88&Session=25 [https://perma.cc/4YED-BYH3]
(last visited Jan. 7, 2018).
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process, but recommending ending its suspension.2 36 Ehrhart, however, was
unwilling to let the issue go.
Ehrhart questioned Georgia Tech President Bud Peterson about campus due
process, arguing Georgia Tech had ruined the rapists' lives. 23 7 In this hearing-
the key legislative event that prompted the new policy-the focus was entirely
on the accused. The only woman who gave live testimony was the mother of a
student suspended for rape.238 All of the testimony and questions were about due
process for accused students. 239 Legislators and witnesses made frequent
references to "ruin[ing]" young men's "lives," but no one acknowledged the
consequences of campus sexual assault to survivors.240
Ehrhart attempted to force Peterson to resign and stripped Georgia Tech of
forty-seven million dollars of funding intended to renovate the Georgia Tech
library. 2 4 1 Peterson defended Georgia Tech's adjudication process and its
decision to expel rapists; he refused to resign, but Georgia Tech withdrew its
request for library funding. 24 2
Around this time, the BOR announced that it would pass a campus sexual
misconduct policy at its next meeting.2 4 3 The policy was not available to the
public until after the deadline to request to speak at the meeting had passed. 244
One student activist was able to obtain a copy of the policy through Georgia's
236. Janel Davis, Review: Tech Frat Got Due Process in Race Case, But Suspension Lifted, ATLANTA J.-
CONST., Feb. 24, 2016, http://www.ajc.com/news/local-education/review-tech-frat-got-due-process
-race-case-but-suspension-lifted/TYz9DfMrXOcBmdSnBn5FhP/ [https://perma.cc/22HT-PZQS].
237. See Davis & McCaffrey, Lawmakers Grill Tech Leaders, supra note 234; cf Greg Bluestein & Jim
Galloway, Powerful State Lawmaker Calls for Georgia Tech President's Ouster, ATLANTA J.-
CONST. (Mar. 7, 2016), http://politics.blog.ajc.com/2016/03/07/powerful-state-lawmaker-calls-for-
georgia-tech-presidents-ouster/?icmp=AJCjinternallink_003012016 digesttease_0301digestO8
[https://perma.cc/X8KZ-V3MP] (quoting Ehrhart as saying "If I have to talk to another
brokenhearted mother about their fine son where any allegation is a conviction and they toss these
kids out of school after three and a half years, sometimes just before graduation, it's just tragic.").
238. Ga. House of Representatives, Appropriations: Higher Education, LiveStream at 29:00 (Jan. 25,
2016), http://original.livestream.com/gahln4O3/video?clipId=pla-d69f82de-76cO- 4 2 d2 -9 8 a6 -8 2 d9f
a8b02aa [https://perma.cc/X8DA-TFSY].
239. Id.
240. Id. Legislators were not sparing with the phrase "ruining their lives," using it to refer not only to
expulsion but also to suspension in abeyance (in which students can participate in class only and are
barred from social activities) and even to the social suspension of a fraternity. Id. at 00:55:00,
01:11:20, 01:12:28, 01:13:07.
241. Bluestein & Galloway, supra note 237.
242. Tech Withdraws Library Budget Request, GA. TECH LIBRARY (Feb. 4, 2016), http://librarynext
.gatech.edu/httprenewallibrarygatecheducontentlatest-news-updates/tech-withdraws-library-budget
-request [https://perma.cc/428C-6GYZ]. It is possible that the request will be granted in the future.
See Janel Davis, State Lawmaker, Georgia Tech President Back on Good Terms, ATLANTA J.-
CONST. (Mar. 9, 2016), http://www.ajc.com/news/local-education/state-lawmaker-georgia-tech-
president-back-good-terms/tEoPSRifb9JKOo2waolOmO/ [https://perma.cc/58DL-X3AQ].
243. Interview with Katherine Napier, student activist, Ga. Inst. of Tech., in Atlanta, Ga. (Jan. 9, 2015)
(on file with author).
244. Id.
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open records law and speak against the policy in the subcommittee meeting,
which was followed by the full BOR meeting.2 4 5 Opponents of the policy
attended the full meeting as well, but were told there was no time for them to
speak.24 6 However, there was time for the BOR to show a video about leap years,
a topic irrelevant to a meeting about sexual violence that took place in March.247
The policy passed unanimously, with no discussion of potential conflicts with
federal law. 2 48
With the exception of the student speaking at a subcommittee meeting, there
was no chance for stakeholders to provide input on the new policy. A Campus
Safety and Security Committee had previously issued a report that might have
informed the policy, but comparing the reports to the new policy shows a drastic
change in topic. 24 9 The committee report never even mentions a standard of
evidence, and repeatedly insists on Title IX compliance. 2 5 0 And it is important to
note that even were the new policy fully in compliance with Title IX, the manner
in which it passed-in which Peterson was almost forced to resign and Georgia
Tech lost forty-seven million dollars of funding-will certainly deter Georgia
schools from expelling students for campus sexual violence.
In the summer of 2017, the Georgia BOR decided to review its policy.2 5 1
Despite input from Georgia student-survivors and their allies, however, the BOR
passed a policy with very few differences from the previous version.25 2 At the
BOR meeting where it passed, one of the members of the Board of Regents asked




248. Interview with Carol Napier, meeting attendee, in Atlanta, Ga. (Jan. 15, 2017) (on file with author).
249. The report of the Campus Safety and Security Committee focused on prevention of sexual assault,
with no hint ofthe most contentious aspects of the new policy. Compare UNIV. SYS. OF GA. CAMPUS
SAFETY AND SEC. COMM., REPORT TO C. HENRY M. HUCKABY 7 (2015) (recommending ensuring
Title IX compliance and preventative measures) with Georgia BOR Policy, supra note 165 (focusing
on adjudication and risking Title IX violations).
250. REPORT TO C. HENRY M. HUCKABY, supra note 249, at 7, 14, 16.
251. Email from Matthew Wolfsen, Chair, Ga. Inst. of Tech. Sexual Violence Advisory Bd., to author
(July 24, 2017) (on file with author).
252. Some substantive changes were made, including adding language that consent can be withdrawn at
any time, deleting a list of examples of protective interim measures, and modifying some of the
details of investigation and hearing requirements. Compare COMM. ON ORG. & LAW, BD. OF
REGENTS OF THE UNIV. SYS. OF GA., Addition to the Policy Manual: 4.1.7 Sexual Misconduct Policy
(2016) (on file with author) with Georgia BOR Policy, supra note 165.
253. Students Against House Bill 51, At the Board of Regents Meeting Where the Proposed University
System of Georgia Sexual Misconduct Policy Revisions (4.1.7 and 4.6.5) Will Be Voted on and
Likely Adopted at 09:55, FACEBOOK LIVE (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.facebook.com
/studentsagainstHB5 l/videos/1 804949066198659/ [https://perma.cc/H2Y2-2UQK].
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was yes, 2 5 4 but as this Article will conclude, the policy forces schools to choose
between violating state law and risking violating Title IX.
2. The Georgia BOR Policy
For the most part, the BOR Policy does not risk running afoul of Title IX-
either the regulations or OCR's interpretation thereof. However, two provisions
in particular have raised substantial criticisms and one provision is in flagrant
conflict with OCR's guidance. This last provision forces Georgia schools into an
impossible position: expel a rapist with only a preponderance of the evidence
and violate state law, use the higher state standard and violate OCR's
interpretation of Title IX, or not expel an adjudicated rapist and risk violating
Title IX itself.
The majority of the BOR Policy focuses on adjudication procedure, but it
also addresses definitions of consent, various forms of sexual misconduct,
reporting, and interim measures.255 It has two features that are unique among all
state legislation surveyed in this Article. First, it has a heavy emphasis on the
need for prompt reporting, repeating three times in two pages that victims should
report promptly.256 Second, it contains a provision stating that false complaints
may be punished with suspension or expulsion.2 57 While neither of these
provisions are facially in violation of Title IX, they have provoked criticism. It
is common for survivors not to report quickly, usually because it takes time to
process trauma and because reporting itself can be daunting. 2 58 In addition, the
false-reporting provision not only deters reporting generally, but also allows
alleged rapists to accuse survivors of false reporting.
Finally, one provision has attracted criticism in part because it flatly
contradicted the then-existing OCR guidance. The BOR Policy requires
institutions to use the preponderance of the evidence standard for adjudication-
except when determining whether the sanction of suspension or expulsion should
apply. 2 5 9 Even after a finding of responsibility on a preponderance of the
evidence, "substantial evidence" is required to expel a student.2 60 Until the
254. Id.
255. See Georgia BOR Policy, supra note 165, §§ 4.1.7.1 (definitions); 4.1.7.2 (reporting); 4.1.7.3(B)
(interim measures).
256. Id. § 4.1.7.2(A).
257. Id. § 4.1.7.2(E).
258. See Nancy C. Cantalupo, Burying Our Heads in the Sand: Lack of Knowledge, Knowledge
Avoidance, and the Persistent Problem of Campus Peer Sexual Violence, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 205,
213 (2011).
259. Georgia BOR Policy, supra note 165, § 4.6.5.2.
260. Id.
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Department of Education revoked the Obama-era guidance, Georgia institutions
were forced to risk their federal funding in order to adhere to the BOR Policy.
Adhering to the BOR Policy during the Obama era would not have
automatically put the school in violation of Title IX, because OCR's
preponderance requirement was not a binding regulation. However, refusing to
apply the preponderance standard would have risked a federal investigation. And
in any subsequent lawsuit over the funding withdrawal, a reviewing court would
have given Skidmore deference to OCR's position on the preponderance
standard.2 6 1 The BOR Policy thus substantially deterred schools from expelling
rapists: expelling a rapist in conformance with the state policy would require
using a standard of evidence that would have invited OCR attention. Yet not
expelling a student-rapist could itself be a Title IX violation, because allowing
the presence of an adjudicated rapist on campus could constitute deliberate
indifference to sex discrimination under Title IX. 2 6 2
The 2017 Q&A changed OCR's position on the required evidentiary
standard.2 63 It is possible that the Georgia policy was a factor in OCR's
decisionmaking; Ehrhart certainly met with DeVos in the months leading up to
the new guidance's release.264 But for a year, the BOR put Georgia schools in an
impossible position. And the fact that the new OCR guidance removes the threat
of federal funding withdrawal does not save Georgia schools entirely. The
unfortunate fact remains that a school could find a student responsible for a
sexual assault by a preponderance of the evidence, but lack substantial evidence
to expel the student. The school would then find itself in the nonsensical situation
of hosting an adjudicated rapist on campus. A survivor whose rapist was found
responsible, yet allowed to remain on campus, would have a strong case to
present in a federal Title IX lawsuit.
Naturally, schools would want to avoid adjudicated rapists remaining
students, and would further want to avoid Ehrhart's attention. A more pessimistic
observer could imagine, then, that schools might relax their efforts to hold sexual
predators accountable, thus avoiding having to acknowledge the predators in
their student bodies. Critically, OCR has announced it will no longer publicize
261. See supra notes 159-161 and accompanying text.
262. Schools are not required to expel rapists, Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 648
(1999), but their failure to do so can and often does create a hostile environment, see, e.g., Doe v.
East Haven Bd. of Educ., 200 Fed. Appx. 46,48 (2d Cir. 2006); Wills v. Brown Univ., 184 F.3d 20,
37 (5th Cir. 1999) ("[T]he continuing presence of the harasser may so alter the terms and conditions
of education that the victim. .. may be able to establish a claim for sex discrimination.").
263. See 2017 Q&A, supra note 17, at 5.
264. See Kimberly Hefling, De Vos Meeting with Ga. Legislator Worries Advocates, POLITICO, Apr. 12,
2017, 10:00 AM, http://www.politico.com/tipsheets/morning-education/2017/04/devos-meeting-
with-ga-legislator-worries-advocates-219731 [https://perma.cc/B7W7-SPSZ].
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the list of schools under investigation, meaning schools will be under less
pressure to hold sexual predators accountable.
26 5
In Georgia, at least, enforcing students' rights under Title IX will fall to
students themselves and administrators willing to risk Ehrhart calling for their
resignation.2 66 Any student bringing an individual lawsuit against the Georgia
BOR Policy could take some encouragement from administrative law. While
Title IX and its regulations likely preempt the Georgia BOR Policy, OCR's
guidance cannot itself preempt Title IX: OCR's interpretation of Title IX may
prevail, but it would not get Chevron deference. At best, the 2017 Q&A would
be entitled to Skidmore deference-but it bears repeating that a factor in whether
guidance deserves Skidmore deference is that guidance's "consistency with
earlier and later pronouncements." 267 As such, the 2017 Q&A is on slightly
shakier ground than the Obama-era documents.
All the same, an individual hostile-environment lawsuit would be an uphill
battle. Any student survivor would have to face not only the Georgia state
government, but also OCR's opposition. On the other hand, student survivor
organizations have years of experience with fighting media battles, and the
public-relations nightmare that populations of adjudicated rapists on Georgia
campuses would trigger is not difficult to imagine.
It is not clear whether the BOR was aware of these problems when the policy
passed. If the BOR had taken the time to allow input from the community, the
conflicts would have become apparent. Moreover, the community would have
been able to point out other policy flaws, such as its complete lack of provisions
for groups who are disproportionately impacted by campus sexual assault. Some
Georgia schools have vastly different student populations, and therefore different
student needs, than other schools. 26 8 The policy leaves no way for schools to
adapt it to address their students' needs.
In sum, the BOR Policy puts Georgia schools into a difficult situation in the
event that they find a student responsible of sexual violence by a preponderance
of the evidence. If anything, the policy-and especially the events surrounding
265. Dana Bolger & Alexandra Brodsky, Trump's Administration Wants to Hide Colleges That Have
Problems with SexualAssault, WASH. POST, June 30, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news
/posteverything/wp/2017/06/30/trumps-administration-wants-to-hide-colleges-that-have-problems-
with-sexual-assault/ [https://perma.cc/L4HL-LH3K].
266. Administrators will no doubt be deterred by the example of Georgia Tech President Bud Peterson,
who was almost forced to resign when Ehrhart summoned Georgia Tech administrators to testify
before his committee. Greg Bluestein & Jim Galloway, Powerful State Lawmaker Calls for Georgia
Tech President's Ouster, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar. 7,2016, http://politics.blog.ajc.com/2016/03/07
/powerful-state-lawmaker-calls-for-georgia-tech-presidents-ouster/?icmp=AJCintemallink_00301
2016_digesttease_0301digestO8 [https://perma.cc/6LCF-JRMZ].
267. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 268 (2006) (internal citations omitted).
268. Georgia hosts diverse schools, including Historically Black Colleges and Universities ("HBCUs"),
men's schools, and women's schools. See Georgia Colleges, COLLEGES SIMPLY (2015), http://www
.collegesimply.com/colleges/georgia/ [https://perma.cc/XL9J-X6ZJ].
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its initial passage-incentivize schools to reduce their enforcement efforts. The
policy also contains several other provisions of questionable wisdom and fails to
address the needs of marginalized communities. Had the state sought stakeholder
input, for example by holding summits like Illinois did, Georgia policymakers
would at least have been aware of the problems.
The BOR Policy may not be the end of Georgia's resistance to Title IX. Just
days before President Trump"s inauguration, Ehrhart introduced a bill that would
bar universities from investigating or punishing any potential felony unless and
until it is adjudicated in criminal court.2 69 According to Ehrhart, the bill would
not be preempted by Title IX because he has had "preliminary discussions" with
the Trump Administration, and does not think the DCL will "hold a heck of a lot
of water." 270 In hindsight, this announcement looks like Ehrhart might have been
told that the DCL would be revoked. Regardless of the DCL's status, however,
Ehrhart did not speak to how Title IX's regulations-requiring a "prompt and
equitable resolution"-will still be law regardless of the Trump OCR's policy.2 7 1
Already, hundreds of Georgia students have organized to oppose the bill,2 72
which passed in the Georgia House, and has now twice failed in the Senate after
concerted opposition by student activists. 2 7 3 It was not an easy fight: activist-
survivors faced extreme hostility from lawmakers, Ehrhart publicly said things
such as "go trigger somewhere else," 274 and another legislator brought one
survivor's attacker to the gallery while she was the invited guest of an opposing
legislator.2 7 5
269. See Ga. Legis. Reg. Sess. 2016-2017, H.B. 51 (2017), available at http://www.legis.ga.gov
/Legislation/20172018/162774.pdf.
270. Tyler Kingkade, Georgia Lawmaker Wants to Stop Colleges from Investigating Rapes, BUZZFEED.
Jan. 13, 2017, https://www.buzzfeed.com/tylerkingkade/georgia-bill-would-stop-colleges-from-
carrying-out-rape-inve [https://perma.cc/R5LP-9K33].
271. Id.
272. See Maureen Downey, Student Survivor ofSexual Assault: Legislators Dismiss and Demean Us. But
We Will Be Heard., ATLANTA J.-CONST., Feb. 27, 2017, http://getschooled.blog.myajc.com/2017/02
/27/student-survivor-of-sexual-assault-legislators-dismiss-and-demean-us-but-we-will-be-heard/
[https://perma.cc/6DEZ-DQAE].
273. Nate Harris, BREAKING: Campus Felony Bill Stalls on Final Georgia Legislative Day, RED &
BLACK, Mar. 31, 2017, https://www.redandblack.com/athensnews/breaking-campus-felony-bill-
stalls-on-final-georgia-legislative-day/article_cf6e7346-15cd-1 1e7-8613-cb0b9f8637a3.html
[https://perma.cc/95UL-CCPB].
274. For a video of the comment, and of a man testifying that being accused of rape is just as traumatizing
as being raped, see Better Georgia, Ga. Rep. Ehrhart Tells Rape Survivors to "Trigger Somewhere
Else" at 00:53, YouTUBE (Mar. 14, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u4sH77HWYuw.
See also Lindsay Gibbs & Casey Quinlan, The Trump Administration Is Systematically Dismantling
Title LY, THINKPROGRESS, June 23, 2017, 6:08 PM, https://thinkprogress.org/how-the-trump-
administration-is-systematically-attacking-title-ix-21bde2f73fc6/ [https://perma.cc/7RLS-RPVH].
275. See Better Georgia, Assault Survivor Fighting Campus Rape Cover-Up Bill Describes Shocking
Experience at GA Capitol at 1:30, FACEBOOK LIvE (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.facebook.com
/bettergeorgia/videos/1274216989344044/.
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The Georgia BOR must rescind the policy before it harms students and
presents costs to the state in litigation fees and damages. If necessary, the Georgia
legislature should step in and legislatively repeal the policy. Georgia legislators
must also ensure that Ehrhart's new bill fails if he proposes it again.
Most states that have turned their attention to campus sexual assault have
only acted on a few specific issues, such as the role of law enforcement or
attorneys in the campus adjudication system. However, a handful of states have
created comprehensive schemes for their universities. With the exception of
Georgia, these states have all required their schools to comply with Title IX and
to be more protective of survivors. Georgia, however, was motivated entirely by
the view that one university had been too strict with students adjudicated
responsible for sexual assault. Without so much as mentioning survivors, one
state congressman pressured the state BOR to pass a system-wide policy. The
resulting policy was enacted so quickly that only one student was ever able to
formally speak against it. Unsurprisingly, the policy fails to account for federal
law or for students of marginalized groups.
No state action is perfect, but several states have made progress. Illinois, for
example, hosted summits during the drafting of its law, enabling stakeholders to
have input. Connecticut has built a stakeholder-review process into the law. With
the various states' mistakes and successes in mind, the next Part creates a
roadmap for states to follow when legislating on campus sexual violence.
IV. A ROADMAP FOR STATE ACTION
Having surveyed existing state legislation and regulation for its strengths and
weaknesses, this Article synthesizes several states' forays into campus sexual
violence and makes a series of recommendations for other states. By creating a
roadmap for state legislation on campus sexual violence, this Part hopes to
encourage other states to protect their students from campus sexual violence-
but to, do so transparently and with an eye to the needs of marginalized
communities.
The needs of students from marginalized communities must be a part of
policymaking from the start. All too often, policies address the "neutral"
student-with "neutral" here typically referring to white, cisgender,
heterosexual, able-bodied 276 students. Students who do not fit into this "neutral"
category experience campus sexual violence in ways that "neutral" policies
cannot address. The example of an undocumented student survivor is instructive.
Contact with law enforcement could lead to deportation proceedings against
undocumented students; undocumented survivors might therefore rationally
276. This list is not intended to be exclusive.
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avoid any reporting that could lead to contact with police.27 7 Thus, a campus
sexual violence policy that mandates reporting to law enforcement would impact
undocumented students in ways that other students would likely not even notice.
Undocumented students are not the only ones who rationally fear contact with
law enforcement. As Venkayla Haynes, a survivor inspired by her experience to
become a student activist, put it,
I was scared to go to law enforcement because the justice system was
not made for individuals of marginalized groups, especially black
people, and I am a black woman. I can't expect a system that was not
created for me to protect my black body.278
Legislators who are not people of color must listen to students like Haynes, or
the legislators may simply never understand the stakes for marginalized students.
Another example is that of LGBTQIA students, or even non-LGBTQIA
students targeted by a member of the same sex. A policy that refers to victims
with female pronouns and attackers with male pronouns could deter a male
survivor, or anyone attacked by a woman, from reporting. Failing to make a
policy gender-inclusive would thus aggravate the already-low reporting rates for
male survivors, who already struggle with societal expectations of masculinity
pressuring men to avoid seeming vulnerable. 2 79 As one male survivor explained,
It's one thing to deal with the aftereffect of being raped, but it also was
a secondary hit for me-oh, you're a guy, how could you be raped by a
woman, that makes no sense.. . . I was afraid to talk to anybody about
it because of the stigma I felt I would receive in taking about it. 28 0
When students live at the intersection of multiple non-"neutral" identities,
campus sexual assault becomes even more difficult to recover from. To many
legislators, intersectionality can come as a dizzying new challenge; they may find
it difficult to keep track of the varying identities, let alone legislate to serve them
277. See, e.g., Tyler Kingkade, 28 Groups That Work with Rape Victims Think the Safe Campus Act is
Terrible, HUFFPOST, Sept. 23, 2015, 1:00 PM, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/rape-victims-
safe-campus-act us 55f300cce4b063ecbfa4150b [https://perma.cc/MM3C-7B6U].
278. Email from Venkayla Haynes, student survivor and activist, Spelman Coll., to author (Sept. 21,
2017) (on file with author).
279. For a detailed narrative by a male survivor, see Emily Kassie, Male Victims of Campus Sexual
Assault Speak Out: 'We're up Against a System That's Not Designed to Help Us', HUFFPOST, Jan.
27, 2016, 7:33 AM, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/27/male-victims-sexual-assault n
6535730.html [https://perma.cc/EBN2-A4E5].
280. Emma Brown, Sexual Assault Survivors Tell Their Stories, WASH. POST, https://www
.washingtonpost.com/graphics/local/sexual-assault/ (male student, South Carolina school) (last
visited Jan. 13, 2018).
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effectively. This is why it is critical for legislators and policymakers to give
diverse student voices a chance to be heard.
Well-crafted campus sexual violence legislation will have the following
four characteristics: flexibility for each school, a procedure to give stakeholders
a voice, periodic review, and harmony with federal law.
A. Minimum Requirements
First, this Article recommends that state legislatures create not a statewide
policy, but minimum requirements. When schools have flexibility to tailor their
policies, students will be better served. Of course, schools may not take campus
sexual violence seriously, so state legislation and Title IX should serve as floors.
In this regard, Connecticut, Illinois, and New York should be models. A state
where schools have a history of particularly poor responses to campus sexual
assault might feel the need to be stricter with its requirements; other states could
be more trusting of their institutions.
B. Stakeholder Input and School-to-School Flexibility
Second, this Article advocates for deliberate, informed, and transparent
procedure in forming the state response, whatever form it takes. Legislation by
its nature has transparency and opportunities for input built in, but policymakers
should go further. Illinois's summits demonstrate one way to invite diverse
stakeholders to collaborate on legislation. Connecticut's campus resource team
review process is another method for involving stakeholders, albeit post hoc.
Ideally, states should ensure that different groups have a voice in forming policy,
both before state legislation is enacted and after. A combination of the
Connecticut and Illinois approaches would ensure plenty of opportunities for
comment. But states must ensure that the different groups, especially groups
representing marginalized communities, actually have an opportunity to be
heard. Connecticut's legislation is very specific about the different interests that
must be represented in the campus resource teams, but a model state approach
would go further. For example, campus resource teams should include a
representative from the campus disability office. Other campus actors may not
be aware of the specific issues facing marginalizdd communities and may not
have the expertise necessary to address them.
Stakeholder input on the creation and review of policies also highlights the
need for schools to have some flexibility. Different schools have different needs.
Georgia, for example, is home to historically black colleges and universities
("HBCUs"), which have different experiences and needs from non-HBCUs. One
HBCU, Spelman, is a women's college. Another, Morehouse, is a men's college.
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Haynes's experience also highlights why schools need flexibility: she attended
an HBCU, where she witnessed "respectability politics" lead to campus
authorities "not properly addressing and fighting against marginalized groups
being impacted by sexual violence." 281 Respectability politics will likely take on
different forms at HIBCUs and majority-white schools. For instance, at HBCUs,
survivors may receive backlash to reporting, encouraging them to "protect their
brothers" or not provoke negative press attention on the universities.28 2 A campus
policy that addresses the specific needs of an HBCU would be a poor fit for non-
HBCUs. A single policy for all Georgia schools would be even worse-and
would likely better serve the interests of schools that skew white and male, 28 3
because it will neglect needs specific to HBCUs or women's colleges.
C. Periodic Review
Third, the state should engage in periodic review of the broader legislation
as well as the individual schools' policies. The state Attorney General, for
example, could lead a periodic review in which representatives from all the
different schools and stakeholder groups could meet to learn from each other's
successes and failures. Like states, schools could become laboratories for policy.
There is no clear solution to campus sexual assault, but some schools have made
progress where others have struggled. If schools communicate with each other,
progress may move faster. The same is true for states: states should learn from
each other. Indeed, it is already becoming clear which states others should learn
from: Connecticut, Illinois, Louisiana, and New York are already each good
examples.
D. Consistency with Federal Law
Finally, states must not force their schools to risk violating Title IX. Ideally,
states will be mindful of the Supremacy Clause and not attempt to do so. As we
have seen with Georgia, however, such a hope may be too idealistic. The next
line of defense is federal enforcement-but as this Article has discussed, federal
enforcement in Title IX is itself at risk. As the Department of Education engages
in notice-and-comment to draft new Title IX regulations, survivors and their
allies are right to be nervous. Even so, DeVos has claimed she wants "the insights
281. Email from Venkayla Haynes, supra note 278.
282. Email from Venkayla Haynes, student survivor and activist, Spelman Coll., to author (Oct. 6, 2017)
(on file with author).
283. The current Georgia BOR has only three female members and only two members of color. Members
ofthe Board, UNIV. SYSTEM OF GA., http://www.usg.edu/regents/members [https://perma.cc/F895-
8XNL] (last visited Oct. 20, 2017).
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of all parties" in the notice-and-comment period.284 She should pay especially
close attention to responses from those parties whose insights are all too often
ignored: students from marginalized communities. Unfortunately, given the
current administration's treatment of transgender students, 285 students brought
without documentation to this country when they were children,2 8 6 and DeVos's
own comments regarding students with disabilities, 287 this Article is pessimistic.
Private litigation may therefore become the only real check on state-law conflicts
with Title IX, meaning the issue will gradually shift from federal administrative
enforcement to federal judicial enforcement.
V. CONCLUSION
After years of progress on campus sexual violence, Title IX is on shaky
ground. It is probably constitutional despite stricter Spending Clause
jurisprudence, but it is impossible to be certain. OCR's guidance document is in
a similar position: it is probably APA compliant, but a reasonable court could
strike it down. Regardless of the legality of current Title IX enforcement,
however, the political reality is that the Trump Administration will probably not
enforce Title IX, or at least not to the benefit of survivors. More likely is a refusal
to hold schools accountable, presaged by the latest OCR guidance.
States, however, have the constitutional authority to act. States should
protect their students from sexual violence, modeling their response on states like
Illinois. Yet states must go further than even than the most progressive state
legislation, because no state has yet to legislate in a way that takes into account
students that are particularly vulnerable to campus sexual violence. This Article
has discussed three groups in particular-students of color, LGBTQIA students,
and undocumented students-but other marginalized groups also need attention,
such as students with disabilities. The only way for states to legislate in an
inclusive manner is for them to actually listen to these students. States should
therefore legislate in an open and transparent way, building student voices into
both the drafting of the legislation and the review of the resulting documents.
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Finally, this Article has shown that we cannot simply trust states to protect
their students from campus sexual violence. Georgia's administrative action was
not only rushed and failed to hear student objections, but forces Georgia schools
to choose between violating state and federal law. Because it is unlikely that the
Trump Administration will bring preemption suits, the responsibility will fall to
private litigants to hold states accountable.
This Article envisions states protecting students from campus sexual
violence, transparently and with attention to the intersecting identities that make
some students more vulnerable. Perhaps soon, a different administration will
pick up where the Obama Administration left off-but for now, the responsibility
to protect students falls to states.

